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INTRODUCTION 
The degree of permissible control national sports leagues 
have over individual franchise owners is an issue that has 
been debated in American sports and in the courts over the 
last hundred years.  The debate generally has centered on 
antitrust law and, in 1922, the Supreme Court issued a 
landmark decision that exempted what we now call Major 
League Baseball (MLB) from the prohibitions of antitrust 
law.1  Presumably, that decision was significantly influenced 
by the perceptLRQ RI 0/% DV $PHULFD·V ´1DWLRQDO 3DVWLPHµ
DQGLWVHQWLWOHPHQWWRSURWHFWLRQDJDLQVWDQWLWUXVWOLWLJDWLRQ·V
potential disruptive results.2  Although courts have not 
extended similar wholesale exemptions to other national 
sports leagues, the Seventh Circuit functionally exempted at 
least some professional sports leagues by holding that leagues 
are single entities and, therefore, cannot violate section 1 of 
the Sherman Antitrust Act.3   
Until recently, however, the issue was anything but 
settled.  In 2006, the Supreme Court demonstrated a 
willingness to address the antitrust issue in a factual setting 
 
 1. See generally )HG%DVHEDOO&OXERI%DOW,QFY1DW·O/HDJXHRI3URI·O%DVHEDOO
Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922) (explaining that a baseball exhibition is not considered trade 
or commerce in the commonly accepted use of those words because a personal effort 
that is not associated with production cannot be a subject of commerce).  
 2. Mitchell Nathanson, 7KH ,UUHOHYDQFH RI %DVHEDOO·V $QWLWUXVW ([HPSWLRQ $
Historical Review, 58 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 2 (2005).  
 3. See generally $P1HHGOH,QFY1DW·O)RRWEDOO/HDJXH)GWK&LU
2008) (holding that professional football teams must be considered a single entity for 
antitrust purposes);; see also generally Chi. Prof·O6SRUWV/WG3·VKLSY1DW·O%DVNHWEDOO
$VV·Q  )G  WK &LU  ILQGLQJ WKDW WKH 1DWLRQDO %DVNHWEDOO $VVRFLDWLRQ
(NBA) functions as a single entity). 
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analogous to the sports league scenario in Texaco Inc. v. 
Dagher4 and, more recently, on June 29, 2009, the Supreme 
Court granted certiorari in the Seventh CircuLW·V GHFLVLRQ
American Needle, Inc. v. National Football League, that 
finally resolved the single entity issue as it pertains to 
national sports leagues.5  On May 24, 2010, a unanimous 
Court held that the National Football League (NFL) could not 
be considered a single entity in the context of intellectual 
property licensing;; rather, the NFL must be viewed as thirty-­
two separate teams that are capable of engaging in concerted 
activity in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.6  While 
WKH&RXUW·VKROGLQJ in American Needle was narrowly tailored, 
WKH RSLQLRQ ´VWURQJO\ VXJJHVWHGµ WKDW PRVW DFWLYLWLHV RI
professional sports leagues also involve concerted conduct.7  
The Court, however, neither fully rejected the single-­entity 
defense nor articulated any test for determining when it 
should be accepted.8 
3ULRU WR WKH &RXUW·V GHFLVLRQ LQ American Needle, the 
question remained as to whether another recent decision out 
of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of 
Arizona, In re Dewey Ranch Hockey, LLC,9 would become 
more or less important to the question of the ability of 
individual franchises to challenge decisions by sports leagues.  
,QOLJKWRIWKH&RXUW·VKROGLQJLQAmerican Needle, however, it 
appears that franchise owners may be even more inclined to 
bring their claims against a sports league in federal district 
court.  Nevertheless, the bankruptcy court may continue to 
IXQFWLRQDVDQ ´HQG UXQµ IRU FODLPDQWV VHHNLQJ UHGUHVV IURP
sports leagues in certain situations.   
The role of the bankruptcy court in decisions relating to 
the permissible control of national sports leagues over 
individual franchise owners is the subject of this Comment.  
In particular, this Comment will address antitrust law as it 
 
 4. See generally Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1 (2006) (holding that two oil 
FRPSDQLHV· joint venture to sell gasoline was not per se illegal because the companies 
were not competing and, rather, price setting like a single entity). 
 5. Am. Needle, 538 F.3d 736, cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 2859 (2009) (No. 08-­661). 
 6. $P1HHGOH,QFY1DW·O Football League, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2206²07 (2010). 
 7. Gregory J. Werden, Initial Thoughts on the American Needle Decision, 
ANTITRUST SOURCE, Aug. 2010, at 1, 7, available at http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-­
source/at-­source.html. 
 8. Id. 
 9. In re Dewey Ranch Hockey, LLC, 414 B.R. 577 (2009).  
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pertains to professional sports leagues and its interplay with 
sections 363 and 365 of the United States Bankruptcy Code 
´WKH&RGHµ)RUFODULW\WKHSURFHGXUDOKHDULQJLQWKHDewey 
Ranch case will be referred to as Dewey Ranch I and the 
decision of the court in that case will be referred to as Dewey 
Ranch II.  
I. CHAPTER 11 BANKRUPTCY 
As a result of the current economic recession, many 
financially troubled businesses have been forced to seek 
bankruptcy protection.10  The sports industry is no exception, 
and the prospect of sports teams filing for bankruptcy has 
become a reality.  The bankruptcy system in the United 
6WDWHVVHUYHVWKH´GXDOUROHµRISURYLGLQJUHOLHIWRGHEWRUVWKDW
have accrued debt beyond their income level while also 
protecting the rights of creditors that are owed money from 
the debtors.11  Maintaining this balance is often difficult, so 
bankruptcy judges are afforded wide decision-­making 
discretion.12  As a result, there is a strong sense of 
unpredictability associated with bankruptcy filings because 
the stakes are high and the outcomes are far from certain. 
Many struggling businesses seek financial protection by 
filing for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 of the Code as a 
PHDQVRI ´UHRUJDQL]LQJµ WKHLUGHEWDQG FRQWLQXLQJ WRSXUVXH
their business.13  Once a bankruptcy petition is filed, an 
automatic stay is issued to prevent creditors from engaging in 
further debt collection efforts.14  Thereafter, a debtor proffers 
D ´SODQ RI UHRUJDQL]DWLRQµ DQG WKHUHE\ DJUHHV WR UHSD\ D
portion of the debt over a specified period of time.15  The 
 
 10. Michael Doyle, Struggling Economy Keeps Bankruptcy Courts Busy, 
MCCLATCHY (Aug. 17, 2010), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2010/08/17/99315/struggling-­
economy-­keeps-­bankruptcy.html.  
 11. See Anthony C. Conveny, 6D\LQJ*RRGE\HWR7H[DV·V+RPHVWHDG3URWHFWLRQ2QH
Step Toward Economic Efficiency with the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2005, 44 HOUS. L. R. 433, 434 n.2 (2007) (citing Charles G. Hallinan, 
7KH ´)UHVK 6WDUWµ 3ROLF\ LQ &RQVumer Bankruptcy: A Historical Inventory and an 
Interpretive Theory, 21 U. RICH. L. REV. 49, 50 (1986)) (noting the dual roles of 
bankruptcy). 
 12. See, e.g.86&D  DOORZLQJDEDQNUXSWF\FRXUW WR´LVVXHDQ\
order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions 
RIWKLVWLWOHµ 
 13. See generally id. §§ 1101²1174. 
 14. Id. § 362.  
 15. See §§ 1121²1129. 
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GHEWRU·VPDQDJHPHQt assumes an additional role as debtor in 
possession (DIP) and maintains control of the business and its 
assets while the plan of reorganization is negotiated between 
the debtor and a committee appointed by United States 
Trustee on behalf of the creditors.16  During the stay period 
DQGZLWKWKHEDQNUXSWF\FRXUW·VSHUPLVVLRQ',3ILQDQFLQJLV
often permitted to allow the bankrupt business to carry on its 
operations.17  Once the reorganization plan is finalized, 
Chapter 11 rules require the creditors to either accept or 
reject the plan.18  The reorganization plan is approved if the 
following two criteria are met: 1) the plan is accepted by more 
than half of the total number of claimants in each class;; and 
 WKH DPRXQW FODLPHG E\ WKRVH ´DFFHSWLQJµ FODLPDQWV LV DW 
least two-­thirds of the total amount claimed against the 
debtor by that class.19  If all classes of creditors do not meet 
these criteria and the creditors reject the reorganization plan, 
the bankruptcy judge still has the discretion to approve the 
plan over an objection by the creditors.20  
In the Chapter 11 bankruptcy case filed by the Phoenix 
Coyotes·VRZQHUVKLSLQWKHDewey Ranch case, the bankruptcy 
judge was afforded the power of approval because the debtors 
and creditors could not agree on a reorganization plan.21  In 
SDUWLFXODUWKHIUDQFKLVH·VLQWHUHVWLQVHFXULQJDPD[LPXPELG
IRU WKH WHDP FRQIOLFWHG ZLWK WKH 1DWLRQDO +RFNH\ /HDJXH·V
1+/ LQWHUHVW LQ SUHYHQWLQJ WKH WHDP·V UHORFDWLRQ WR
Canada.22  7KH &R\RWHV·V ILOLQJ LV WKH ILUVW WLPH WKDW D 
bankruptcy court has been called upon to resolve issues 
LQYROYLQJ D SURIHVVLRQDO VSRUWV WHDP·V HIIRUWV WR FLUFXPYHQW
league control of sales agreements and franchise relocation.23  
 
 16. See §§1101²1107;; see also Harvey R. Miller, Corporate Governance in Chapter 
11: The Fiduciary Relationship Between Directors and Stockholders of Solvent and 
Insolvent Corporations, 23 SETON HALL L. REV. 1467, 1467²68 (1993). 
 17. Robert R. Bliss & George G. Kaufman, U.S. Corporate and Bank Insolvency 
Regimes: A Comparison and Evaluation, 2 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 143, 162 (2007). 
 18. § 1126. 
 19. § 1126(c). 
 20. § 1129(b);; Jeffery M. Sharp, Bankruptcy Reorganizations, Section 1129, and the 
New Capital Quagmire: A Call for Congressional Response, 28 AM. BUS. L.J. 525, 550 
(1991);; Jeffrey I. Werbalowsky, Reforming Chapter 11: Building an International 
Restructuring Model, 8 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 561, 574 n.40 (1999). 
 21. See generally In re Dewey Ranch Hockey, LLC, 414 B.R. 577 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 
2009). 
 22. Id. at 589.  
 23. In re Dewey Ranch Hockey, LLC, 406 B.R. 30, 35 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2009). 
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Prior to this bankruptcy filing, it remained unclear as to how 
such a matter would be decided in consideration of the 
antitrust law provisions and the complicated contractual 
responsibilities and obligations between sports leagues and 
member teams. 
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND OF THE PHOENIX COYOTES 
BANKRUPTCY CASE 
A. Changing Hunting Grounds: From Canada to Phoenix 
and Back Again 
The NHL is an organization comprised of thirty 
competitive member teams throughout North America, 
including six teams located in Canada and twenty-­four teams 
located in the United States.24  In January 1996, the NHL 
granted a change of ownership to what was then the 
:LQQLSHJ -HWV DQG DXWKRUL]HG WKH WHDP·V PRYH WR 3KRHQL[
Arizona.25  The team was subsequently renamed the Coyotes 
and, until December 2003, the team played its home games in 
the 3KRHQL[ 6XQV·V DUHQD26  In 2001, Jerry Moyes invested 
necessary cash assets in the team and, in November of that 
\HDU WKUHH UHODWHG HQWLWLHV FROOHFWLYHO\ UHIHUUHG WR DV ´WKH
'HEWRUVµ27 and the City of Glendale entered into an 
agreement to build a new hockey facility adjoining the 
Westgate Shopping Center in Glendale.28  Under the 
agreement, Glendale agreed to fund the construction of the 
QHZDUHQDDQG LQUHWXUQ WKH&R\RWHV·VRZQHUVKLSSURPLVHG
that: 1) all Coyotes home games would be played at the arena 
through 2035;; 2) Glendale had the right to seek specific 
performance to enforce this promise;; and 3) if the agreement 
was terminated early and the specific performance right was 
not available, liquidated damages would be assessed.29  In 
 
 24. In re Dewey Ranch, 414 B.R. at 581. 
 25. Id. at 579. 
 26. In re Dewey Ranch, 406 B.R. at 33.  The Phoenix Suns is an NBA franchise that 
SOD\V LWV KRPH JDPHV LQ 3KRHQL[·V 86 $LUZD\V &HQWHU  See U.S. AIRWAYS CENTER, 
http://www.usairwayscenter.com/start/ (last visited Nov. 26, 2010).  
 27. 7KH´'HEWRUVµUHIHUVWRWKHIROORZLQJSDUWLHVZKRILOHGWKH&KDSWHUSHWLWLRQ
on May 5, 2009:  Dewey Ranch Hockey, LLC;; Coyotes Holdings, LLC;; Coyotes Hockey, 
LLC;; and Arena Management Group, LLC.  Amended Complaint at 1, In re Dewey 
Ranch, 414 B.R. 577 (No. 2:09-­bk-­09488). 
 28. In re Dewey Ranch, 406 B.R. at 33. 
 29. Id.  Glendale predicted that it would acquire $795 million in various taxes and 
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December 2003, the team played its first home game in the 
arena and, since that time, the team has continued to play 
there.30 
B. The Steady Decline of the Coyotes Franchise 
By 2006, the Coyotes were experiencing financial 
difficulties, and, after certain litigation ensued, the Coyotes 
entered into a consent agreement, which included, among 
RWKHU SURYLVLRQV WKDW 0R\HV ZRXOG EHFRPH WKH WHDP·V
controlling owner.31  The financial difficulties continued, 
however, and, by the summer of 2008, the Coyotes were in 
serious financial trouble.32  The team had a losing record and 
had failed to make the NHL playoffs since moving to 
Arizona.33  In addition, the Coyotes had lost considerable 
money since the move.34  Moyes advanced substantial funds35 
to prolong operations, but the losses continued from 2006 to 
2008.36  At that point, Moyes informed the NHL that he no 
longer would fund the operating losses of the Coyotes and, 
XSRQ0R\HV·VUHTXHVWWKH1+/EHJDQSURYLGLQJIXQGVWRWKH
Coyotes through loans and advances based upon the 
expectation of future Coyotes revenues.37  In an effort to 
alleviate the grave financial situation, both Moyes and the 
NHL actively sought new owners and investors for the 
Coyotes.38 
In early 2009, Moyes instructed his attorney, Earl 
Scudder, to formally seek a new owner for the team, and 
Scudder periodically informed the NHL³particularly 
Commissioner Gary Bettman and Deputy Commissioner 
William Daley³of his marketing efforts.39  In the spring of 
36(6SRUWVDQG(QWHUWDLQPHQW/3´36(µWKURXJKLWV
principal James Balsillie, FRQWDFWHG6FXGGHUUHJDUGLQJ36(·V
 
fees from the new arena over the thirty-­year period set out in the agreement.  Id. 
 30. Id.  
 31. In re Dewey Ranch, 414 B.R. at 580. 
 32. In re Dewey Ranch, 406 B.R. at 33. 
 33. In re Dewey Ranch, 414 B.R. at 579. 
 34. Id.  
 35. The funds are estimated at over $300 million.  See In re Dewey Ranch, 406 B.R. 
at 33. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 33²34. 
 38. Id.  
 39. In re Dewey Ranch, 414 B.R. at 580. 
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interest in acquiring the team and moving it back to 
Canada.40  36(·V RIIHUZDV QRW IRUPDOO\ SXUVXHG XQWLO $SULO
2009 when efforts to find other purchasers proved futile.41  
PSE proposed to purchase the Coyotes and move the team to 
Hamilton, Ontario.42  Hamilton, however, is located in close 
proximity to Buffalo, New York and Toronto, Ontario, where 
NHL franchises are currently located.43  Allegedly, when 
6FXGGHU FRQWDFWHG %HWWPDQ UHJDUGLQJ 36(·V LQWHUHVW LQ
acquiring the team and moving it to Southern Ontario, 
Bettman advised 6FXGGHU WKDW ´KH ZDQWHG WKH WHDP WR VWD\
in Glendale and that there would be no relocation to Canada 
EHFDXVH 6RXWKHUQ 2QWDULR ZDV WKH 1+/·V WHUULWRU\µ44  This 
ZDV36(·VWKLUGDWWHPSWWRDFTXLUHDQ1+/IUDnchise and, for 
DWKLUGWLPHWKH1+/UHMHFWHG36(·VRIIHU45  
C. Relief Sought in the Bankruptcy Proceeding 
%\0D\   WKH EDWWOH RYHU WKH &R\RWHV·V UHORFDWLRQ
was underway.  Realizing that the fate of the Coyotes was on 
the line, Bettman and Daley flew to Arizona and presented a 
letter of intent for the NHL to purchase both the Coyotes and 
the arena rights.46  On that same day, however, the Debtors 
sought bankruptcy protection by filing a Chapter 11 
bankruptcy proceeding in the United States Bankruptcy 
Court for the District of Arizona.47  Also on that same day, the 
&R\RWHVHQWHUHGLQWRDQ$VVHW3XUFKDVH$JUHHPHQW´$3$µWR
sell the team to PSE.48  The APA required that: 1) PSE would 
pay the Coyotes $212,500,000 in cash for the team and most 
of its assets, including the rights as a member team in the 
NHL;; 2) any bankruptcy court order approving the sale would 
expressly provide that the home games would be played in 
6RXWKHUQ 2QWDULR GHVSLWH WKH 1+/ RU LWV PHPEHUV· ODFN RI
consent or agreement;; and 3) the APA would terminate on 
 
 40. Id.  
 41. Id.  
 42. In re Dewey Ranch, 406 B.R. at 32. 
 43. Amended Complaint, supra note 27, at 7. 
 44. In re Dewey Ranch, 406 B.R. at  7KH&R\RWHV·VSURSRVHG UHORFDWLRQZRXOG
place the team within the home territory of both Buffalo and Toronto.  Amended 
Complaint, supra note 27, at 8. 
 45. In re Dewey Ranch, 414 B.R. at 581. 
 46. In re Dewey Ranch, 406 B.R. at 34.  
 47. Amended Complaint, supra note 27, at 3. 
 48. In re Dewey Ranch, 406 B.R. at 32. 
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June 29, 2009 if the requisite bankruptcy sale order had not 
been issued.49  In light of this agreement, the Debtors filed a 
PRWLRQUHTXHVWLQJWKHEDQNUXSWF\FRXUWWRDSSURYHWKHWHDP·V
VDOHWR36(DQGWRSHUPLWWKHWHDP·VUHORFDWLRQWRCanada.50  
By filing for bankruptcy, Moyes and the Debtors temporarily 
GRGJHGWKH1+/·VLQWHUYHQWLRQDQGWKHWHDP·VIDWHZDVOHIWLQ
the hands of a judge with broad discretion and a legislative 
mandate to balance the rights of the Debtor and creditors as a 
class.  
D. Antitrust Violations Raised During the Bankruptcy 
Proceeding 
On May 7, 2009, the Coyotes, through Coyotes Hockey 
LLC, filed an adversary proceeding as a part of the pending 
bankruptcy proceeding against the NHL.51  Pursuant to 
section 16 of the Clayton Act, the Coyotes sought to enjoin the 
NHL from prohibiting the relocation of the Coyotes to 
Hamilton, Canada in violation of sections 1 and 2 of the 
Sherman Act.52  Specifically, the team sought relief under 
federal and state antitrust laws due to claimed impending 
ORVVRUGDPDJHVUHVXOWLQJIURPWKH1+/·VH[HUFLVHRIPDUNHW
power to prevent the Coyotes from moving to Canada while 
continuing to play in the league.53 
Traditionally, antitrust laws safeguard consumer interests 
E\ SUHYHQWLQJ WKH ´FRQFHQWUDWLRQ RI HFRQRPLF SRZHU LQ WKH
 
 49. Id.  
 50. Id. at 34²35.  The NHL and Glendale strongly opposed this motion and urged 
the court to deny the sale and relocation of the team.  Id.   
 51. See Amended Complaint, supra note 27, at 1. 
 52. Id. at 3. 
 53. Id. DW   7KH$PHQGHG&RPSODLQW LGHQWLILHV WKH UHOHYDQW ´PDUNHWµ DVPDMRU
OHDJXHPHQ·VSURIHVVLRQDOLFHKRFNH\Id. at 5.  When an adversary proceeding arises in 
or is related to cases under title 11, the district court has original but not exclusive 
jurisdiction.  28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (2006).  With the consent of all parties, the district 
court may refer a proceeding related to a case under title 11 to a bankruptcy judge to 
hear and enter appropriate orders or judgments.  Id. § 157(c).  On the motion of a party, 
WKHGLVWULFWFRXUWPD\ZLWKGUDZDSURFHHGLQJLI LWUHTXLUHV´FRQVLGHUDWLRQRIERWKWLWOH
11 and other laws of the United States regulating organizations or activities affecting 
LQWHUVWDWH FRPPHUFHµ   G  ,Q WKH &R\RWHV·V DGYHUVDU\ SURFHHGLQJ Eankruptcy 
court jurisdiction was never contested, and the NHL requested that the bankruptcy 
MXGJHUXOHRQLWVVXEVWDQWLYHJURXQGVIRUGLVPLVVDO1DWLRQDO+RFNH\/HDJXH·V0RWLRQ
to Dismiss or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment at 1, In re Dewey Ranch 
Hockey, 406 B.R. 30 (2009) (No. 2:09-­bk-­09488-­57%3 >KHUHLQDIWHU 1+/·V 0RWLRQ WR
Dismiss]. 
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KDQGV RI D IHZµ DQG WKHUHE\ SUHVHUYLQJ FRPSHWLWLRQ LQ WKH
marketplace.54  In relying on established antitrust law, the 
&R\RWHVFODLPHGWKDWWKH1+/·VDFWLRQZDVXQODZIXOEHFDXVH
WKH 1+/·V &RQVWitution and Bylaws serve to unreasonably 
restrict trade and exclude competition.55  Article 4.3 of the 
1+/&RQVWLWXWLRQVWDWHV LQSDUW WKDW ´1RIUDQFKLVHVKDOOEH
granted for home territory within the home territory of a 
member without the written consent RIVXFKPHPEHUµ56  This 
provision is particularly relevant to the proposed relocation of 
WKH&R\RWHVEHFDXVHWKHWHDP·VUHORFDWLRQWR+DPLOWRQZRXOG
KDYH SODFHG WKH &R\RWHV ZLWKLQ WKH ´KRPH WHUULWRU\µ RI WKH
Toronto Maple Leafs.57  The Coyotes argued that permitting 
DQRWKHU IUDQFKLVH WR H[HUFLVH YHWR SRZHU RYHU D FRPSHWLWRU·V
relocation is anticompetitive and detrimental to consumers 
who benefit from increased competition.58   
Similarly, the Coyotes argued that other provisions in the 
1+/·V&RQVWLWXWLRQDQG%\ODZVSHUWDLQLQJWRUHORFDWLRQ´DUH
equally exclusionary and anticompetitive and are without any 
pro-­FRPSHWLWLYH MXVWLILFDWLRQµ59  Section 4.2 of the NHL 
&RQVWLWXWLRQ VWDWHV LQ SDUW WKDW ´1RPHPEHU VKDOO WUDQVIHU
its club and franchise to a different city or borough.  No 
additional cities or boroughs shall be added to the League 
circuit without consent of three-­fourths of all the members of 
WKH /HDJXHµ60  Further, section 36 of the NHL Bylaws 
indicates that an application for relocation must be filed by 
January 1 of the year preceding the year in which the 
relocating team wishes to begin playing in its new stadium.61  
The Coyotes argued that this provision imposed an 
unreasonable process of relocation because the requirement 
would result in a lengthy investigation that would effectively 
delay a proposed sale and relocation and, therefore, grant the 
1+/D´SRFNHWYHWRµRIWKHWUDQVDFWLRQ62 
When considered collectively, the Coyotes argued that 
 
 54. 8QLWHG6WDWHVY9RQ·V*URFHU\&R86 
 55. Amended Complaint, supra note 27, at 2. 
 56. Id. at 8. 
 57. Id.  The Toronto Maple Leafs plays its home games in Air Canada Center, 
located only forty-­one miles from Hamilton.  Id. 
 58. Id. at 8. 
 59. Id. at 9.   
 60. Id. at 10. 
 61. Amended Complaint, supra note 27, at 10.  
 62. Id. at 11. 
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VXFKUHVWULFWLRQV ´XQGXO\DQGXQODZIXOO\µ UHVWULFW WKHDELOLW\
of the Coyotes and other member clubs from relocating and 
that such provisions are illegal under antitrust laws because 
they serve no purpose except to lessen competition and 
PDLQWDLQ D FRPSHWLWRU WHDP·V GRPLQDQW SRVLWLRQ LQ WKH
league.63  Although the court focused on bankruptcy-­related 
issues for its ruling in the Dewey Ranch decisions,64 the legal 
issues presented in the bankruptcy proceeding trigger both 
bankruptcy law and antitrust law.  Additionally, the court in 
the Dewey Ranch decisions was expansive in discussing the 
antitrust implications and past case law on the antitrust 
issues.  To gain a thorough understanding of the decisions, it 
is important to review antitrust law and its application to 
sports leagues.  
III.ANTITRUST LAW AND PROFESSIONAL SPORTS LEAGUES 
A. The Sherman Act, Section 1 
6HFWLRQRI WKH6KHUPDQ$FWVWDWHV WKDW´HYHU\FRQWUDFW
combination . . . or conspiracy in restraint of trade . . . is 
GHFODUHG WR EH LOOHJDOµ65  In essence, section 1 prohibits 
concerted action from independent entities that unreasonably 
restrains trade.66  To establish concerted action, there must be 
evidence that the defendants were not acting independently 
DQG WKDW WKH\ ´KDG D FRQVFLRXV FRPPLWPHQW WR D FRPPRQ
VFKHPH GHVLJQHG WR DFKLHYH DQ XQODZIXO REMHFWLYHµ67  
Recognizing that, if interpreted as broadly as the language 
would seem to require, this section would declare most 
contracts to constitute a restraint of trade,68 the Supreme 
 
 63. Id. at 10, 17. 
 64. ´'HZH\5DQFK'HFLVLRQVµ UHIHUV WR WKHPRWLRQ ILOHG RQ -XQH  Dewey 
Ranch I, and the opinion filed on September 30, 2009, Dewey Ranch II.  
 65. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
 66. See Michael D. Paley, Prosecuting Failed Attempts to Fix Prices as Violations of 
the Mail and Wire Fraud Statutes: Elliot Ness Is Back!, 73 WASH. U. L. QUARTERLY 333, 
362 (1995). 
 67. Monsanto Co. v. Spray-­Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 764 (1984) (quoting 
Edward J. Sweeney & Sons, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 637 F.2d 105, 111 (1980)). 
 68. See Jonathan C. Latimer, The NBA Salary Cap: Controlling Labor Costs 
Through Collective Bargaining, 44 CATH. U. L. REV. 205, 221 n.120 (1994) (noting that 
WKHODQJXDJHLQVHFWLRQLV´EURDGHQRXJKWRUHQGHUPRVWW\SHVRIEXVLQHVVDJUHHPHQWV
LOOHJDO´ 
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&RXUWDGRSWHGD´5XOHRI5HDVRQµDQDO\VLV69  Under the Rule 
of Reason approach, a court balanceV ´WKH SURFRPSHWLWLYH
HIIHFWVRI UHVWUDLQWDJDLQVWWKHDQWLFRPSHWLWLYHHIIHFWVµ70 and, 
LQ GRLQJ VR FRQVLGHUV ´WKH IDFWV SHFXOLDU WR WKH EXVLQHVV WR
which the restraint is applied, its condition before and after 
the restraint was imposed, [and] the nature of the restraint 
DQGLWVHIIHFWDFWXDORUSUREDEOHµ71  Once the court weighs the 
factors, only restraints that are deemed to be unreasonable 
violate section 1.72 
B. Professional Sports Leagues and the Single Entity 
Defense  
With the exception of MLB,73 professional sports leagues 
repeatedly have been faced with antitrust challenges under 
section 1.  In the early days of professional sports, it was easy 
for teams to enter the leagues and yet it was very difficult for 
teams to be profitable.74  To minimize the threat of 
competition between teams, the leagues implemented 
territorial restrictions that guaranteed each team an 
exclusive territory to compete in.75  Today, the costs 
associated with starting a new team have substantially 
increased and existing teams are extremely profitable.76  In 
light of this development, some argue that the 
anticompetitive territory restrictions should be prohibited as 
a section 1 violation.77  To defeat such allegations, the leagues 
 
 69. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 66 (1911).   
 70. Thomas R. Hurst & Jeffery M. McFarland, The Effect of Repeal of the Baseball 
Antitrust Exemption on Franchise Relocation, 8 DEPAUL-­LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 263, 273 
(1998).  
 71. Chi. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). 
 72. See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997). 
 73. Major League Baseball was afforded an antitrust exemption by the Supreme 
Court in 1922.  See generally )HG%DVHEDOO&OXERI%DOW,QFY1DW·O/HDJXHRI3URI·O
Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922).  The Supreme Court has reaffirmed this 
exemption twice.  See generally Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972) (holding that there 
LV D ORQJVWDQGLQJ H[HPSWLRQ RI SURIHVVLRQDO EDVHEDOO·V UHVHUYH V\VWHP IURP IHGHUDO
antitrust laws);; see also generally Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, 346 U.S. 356 (1953) (holding 
that Congress had no intention of including the business of baseball within the scope of 
the federal antitrust laws).  
 74. Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., A Proposal for the Antitrust Regulation of Professional 
Sports, 79 B.U. L. REV. 889, 940²41 (1999). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
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have attempted to characterize themselves as single entities.78  
As single entities, sports leagues would fall outside the 
purview of section 1 because the necessary concerted conduct 
that is essential to any section 1 claim would not be present.79   
Courts have struggled to articulate a definite single entity 
test and to define how the Rule of Reason analysis applies to 
professional sports leagues when the single entity status 
comes under scrutiny.  It was not until the decision in 
American Needle that the Supreme Court finally rejected a 
VSRUWVOHDJXH·VVLQJOHHQtity defense.80  Although this decision 
has brought clarity to the single entity issue surrounding 
major league sports, the Court avoided clarifying the Rule of 
Reason analysis as it applies to sports franchises and leagues 
by remanding the case to the lower court for application.81  In 
doing so, it left the issue open for debate.   
Before American Needle, federal courts were split in 
approach and outcome when applying the antitrust analysis 
to professional sports leagues.  Inconsistent case law resulted 
from WKH FRXUWV· LQDELOLW\ WR GLIIHUHQWLDWH EHWZHHQ WKH
cooperative and competitive factors in the leagues.82  Some 
courts have deemed the cooperative operations of a league to 
be pervasive and worthy of single entity status.83  Other 
courts, however, have focused on the economic competition 
between teams in a league and have viewed teams as 
independent entities within the league.84  
Initially, professional sports leagues were successful in 
raising the single entity defense.  In San Francisco Seals v. 
National Hockey League, the United States District Court for 
the Central District of California determined that the NHL 
was a single entity and, therefore, held that its actions did not 
violate section 1.85  The court based its holding on its finding 
 
 78. See Michael S. Jacobs, Professional Sports Leagues, Antitrust, and the Single-­
Entity Theory: A Defense of the Status Quo, 67 IND. L.J. 25, 27²28 (1991) (analyzing the 
treatment of professional sports leagues as single entities).  
 79. Id.  
 80. See generally $P1HHGOH,QFY1DW·O)RRWEDOO/HDJXH6&W 
 81. See id. at 2217. 
 82. Piraino, supra note 74, at 893.  
 83. See, e.g6)6HDOV/WGY1DW·O+RFNH\/HDJXH)6XSS&'&DO
1974). 
 84. See, e.g./$0HP·O&ROLVHXP&RPP·QY1DW·O)RRWEDOO/HDJXH)G
(9th Cir. 1984). 
 85. S.F. Seals, 379 F. Supp. at 968²71.  The owner of the Seals franchise claimed 
WKDWWKH1+/·VUHIXVDOWRDSSURYHWKHWHDP·VUHTXHVWWRPRYHWR9DQFRXYHUFRQVWLWXWHG
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WKDW 1+/ WHDPV DUH QRW FRPSHWLWRUV EXW UDWKHU ´DOO
PHPEHUV RI D VLQJOH XQLWµ86  Similarly, Levin v. National 
Basketball Association87 DOVR ´IOLUWHGµ ZLWK WKH VLQJOH HQWLW\
defense.88  In Levin, the court relied on the San Francisco 
Seals decision and its analysis regarding single entity status 
to hold that section 1 was inapplicable in light of the asserted 
antitrust allegations because the plaintiffs merely wanted to 
join other member teams in the league, not compete with 
them.89  
By contrast, other federal courts have simply refused to 
grant professional sports leagues single entity status.90  These 
FRXUWV KDYH FRQFOXGHG WKDW GHVSLWH D OHDJXH·V QXPHURXV
cooperative aspects, the teams within a league compete 
against each other economically and, therefore, the league as 
a whole cannot be considered a single entity.91  In North 
American Soccer League v. National Football League, the 
Second Circuit refused to regard the NFL as a single entity 
and, instead, distinguished the league as a joint venture.92  
While the court noted that basic cooperation and some shared 
revenues are integral to the league, the court concluded that 
NFL teams are independent both structurally and 
economically and, therefore, cannot capitalize on a single 
entity defense.93  The Ninth Circuit reached a similar decision 
in Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission v. National 
Football League ´Raiders Iµ94  7KHFRXUWUHMHFWHGWKH1)/·V
 
a violation of section 1.  Id. at 967. 
 86. Id. at 970.  
 87. /HYLQ Y 1DW·O %DVNHWEDOO $VV·Q  ) 6XSS  6'1<   7ZR
businessmen had an agreement to purchase the Boston Celtics, but they were denied 
transfer of membership.  Id. at 150.  Shortly thereafter, the businessmen filed suit, 
alleging antitrust violations.  Id. at 151.  
 88. Daniel E. Lazaroff, The Antitrust Implications of Franchise Relocation 
Restrictions in Professional Sports, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 157, 170 (1984). 
 89. Levin, 385 F. Supp. at 152 n.6. 
 90. See Lazaroff, supra note 88, at 171²73. 
 91. See id. at 184. 
 92. 1$P6RFFHU/HDJXHY1DW·O)RRWEDOO/HDJXH)G  G&LU
1982).  North American Soccer League and its members brought a section 1 claim 
DJDLQVW WKH 1)/ LQ UHVSRQVH WR WKH 1)/·V FURVV-­ownership ban that prohibited its 
members from owning interests in other professional sports leagues.  Id. 
 93. Id. at 1252. 
 94. /$0HP·O&ROLVHXP&RPP·QY1DW·O)RRWEDOO/HDJXH)GWK&LU
1984).  In 1980, the Los Angeles Rams chose to play their home games in Anaheim and, 
in doing so, left their former stadium, the Los Angeles Coliseum, without a team.  Id. at 
1385.  To fill this void, the Coliseum negotiated with Oakland Raiders owner Al Davis 
to move the team to Los Angeles.  Id.  The NFL, however, voted 22-­0 against the 
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VLQJOH HQWLW\ GHIHQVH DQG IRXQG LQVWHDG WKDW ´1)/ SROLFLHV
are not set by one individual or parent corporation, but by the 
VHSDUDWH WHDPV DFWLQJ MRLQWO\µ95  As a result, the court 
GHWHUPLQHGWKDWWKH1)/·VDWWHPSWWRSUHYHQWWKHUHORFDWLRQ
of the Raiders could not be analyzed outside the scope of 
section 1.96   
Once a court resolves the single entity issue and 
determines that professional sports teams are separate 
entities for antitrust purposes, the question remains whether 
section 1 has been violated by the franchise restriction.97  In 
making this determination, a court must decide whether to 
apply a per se approach or, alternatively, the Rule of Reason 
analysis in determining a violation of section 1.98  In most 
section 1 cases involving restraints imposed by professional 
sports leagues, courts have repeatedly adopted the Rule of 
Reason analysis.99  In Raiders I, for example, the court turned 
to the Rule of Reason and found that NFL Rule 4.3 restricting 
franchise movement violated section 1.100  The court, however, 
QRWHGWKDWWKH´UHDVRQDEOHQHVVRIUHVWUDLQWLVD¶SDUDGLJPIDFW
TXHVWLRQ·µ101 thereby implying that similar restraint could be 
reasonable under different factual circumstances.  The Ninth 
Circuit expanded on this factual analysis approach in 
National Basketball Association v. SDC Basketball Club, Inc. 
´Clippersµ102  In reference to the holding in Raiders I, the 
court in Clippers stated that the franchise relocation 
 
relocation under the authority of NFL Rule 4.3, which required unanimous approval by 
all NFL teams when a team sought to relocate in the home territory of a member team.  
Id. DW   )ROORZLQJ WKH1)/·V UHMHFWLRQ RI WKH UHORFDWLRQ WKH &ROLVHXP ILOHG VXLW
claiming that NFL Rule 4.3 violated antitrust laws.  Id. at 1386. 
 95. Id. at 1389.  
 96. Id. at 1401.  
 97. Lazaroff, supra note 88, at 175.  
 98. Id.  
 99. Michael A. McCann, American Needle v. NFL: An Opportunity to Reshape 
Sports Law, 119 YALE L.J. 726, 737 (2010) (citing Glen O. Robinson, Explaining 
Vertical Agreements: The Colgate Puzzle and Antitrust Method, 80 VA. L. REV. 577, 605 
(1994)). 
 100. /$0HP·O&ROLVHXP, 726 F.2d at 1392²98. 
 101. Id. at 1401 (quoting Betaseed, Inc. v. U & I, Inc., 681 F.2d 1203, 1228 (9th Cir. 
1982)).  
 102. 1DW·O %DVNHWEDOO $VV·Q v. SDC Basketball Club, Inc., 815 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 
1987).  The San Diego Clippers attempted to move their franchise to Los Angeles, but 
the NBA contested the relocation under Article 9 of its Constitution, which states that 
no team can move into another WHDP·VKRPH WHUULWRU\ZLWKRXWZULWWHQ DSSURYDO IURP
the member franchise.  Id. at 564.  Rather than risk antitrust liability by forbidding the 
move, the NBA sought a declaratory judgment.  Id. at 563.  
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restriction should not be construed as invalid under antitrust 
law as a matter of law.103  In rejecting the per se approach, the 
court reiterated that the issue of whether a franchise 
movement rule violates antitrust laws is a question of fact 
regarding the reasonableness of the restraint.104  The court 
ultimately determined that the NBA did not violate section 1 
because the league did not absolutely forbid relocation of the 
team.105  Although different in their results, Raiders I and 
Clippers are significant cases because their holdings reveal 
WKH1LQWK&LUFXLW·V UHMHFWLRQ RI SHU VH YLRODWLRQV RI DQWLWUXVW
ODZDQGXQGHUVFRUH WKHFLUFXLW·V OR\DOW\ WRD IDFWXDODQDO\VLV
under the Rule of Reason.   
,Q WKH ZDNH RI WKH 1LQWK &LUFXLW·V UXOLQJV WKH 6XSUHPH
&RXUW·V GHFLVLRQ LQ Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube 
Corp. rekindled issues surrounding the single entity 
defense.106  In Copperweld, the Court held that a parent and 
its wholly-­owned subsidiary are legally incapable of 
conspiracy for antitrust purposes and, consequently, that the 
corresponding activity of a parent and its wholly-­owned 
subsidiary must be viewed as that of a single enterprise for 
purposes of section 1.107  Although the decision was narrowly 
framed, lower courts have interpreted the case more broadly 
as applicable to professional sports leagues and the single 
entity defense.  In the various rulings citing and 
distinguishing Copperweld, only the Seventh Circuit has 
found the single entity defense to be persuasive.108  By 
contrast, the First109 and Eighth110 Circuits have refused to 
extend single entity status to professional sports leagues, and 
 
 103. Id. at 568. 
 104. Id.  
 105. Id.  
 106. See generally Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 
(1984). 
 107. Id. at 771.  
 108. See, e.g.&KL3URI·O6SRUWV/WG3·VKLSY1DW·O%DVNHWEDOO$VV·Q, 95 F.3d 593, 
597 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding that the NBA functions as a single entity by producing a 
VLQJOH SURGXFW QDPHO\ ´1%$ %DVNHWEDOOµ WKDW FRPSHWHV ZLWK RWKHU IRUPV RI
entertainment).  The court noted, however, that such a determination is case-­sensitive 
DQGPXVWEHDQDO\]HG´RQHIDFHWRIDOHDJXHDWDWLPHµId. at 600. 
 109. See generally Fraser v. Major League Soccer, 284 F.3d 47 (1st Cir. 2002);; see 
also generally 6XOOLYDQY1DW·O)RRWEDOO/HDJXH)GVW&LU 
 110. See generally 6W/RXLV&RQYHQWLRQ	9LVLWRUV&RPP·QY1DW·O)RRWEDOO/HDJXH
154 F.3d 851 (8th Cir. 1998);; see also generally 0F1HLOY1DW·O)RRWEDOO/HDJXH)
Supp. 871 (D. Minn. 1992). 
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the D.C.,111 Second,112 and Ninth113 Circuits have not 
reevaluated the issue of single entity defense since 
Copperweld and, therefore, their precedents rejecting this 
defense have not been overturned.114 
Despite the conflicting case law on the single entity issue, 
the possibility for unified precedent materialized in 2006 
when the Supreme Court ruled in Dagher that a joint 
venture115 operates as a single entity for antitrust purposes.116  
Typically, joint ventures and single entities are not identical 
or even similar concepts, and a single entity is considered 
immune from Sherman Act liability while a joint venture 
between independently owned teams is subject to section 1 
review.117  In Dagher, however, Justice Thomas intermingled 
the two concepts by noting that the price fixing at issue in the 
FDVH´DPRXQW>HG@WROLWWOHPRUHWKDQSULFHVHWWing by a single 
entity³albeit within the context of a joint venture³and not a 
SULFLQJDJUHHPHQWEHWZHHQFRPSHWLQJHQWLWLHVµ118  The Court 
concluded that the joint action did not violate the Sherman 
Act because the Texaco and Shell oil companies shared profits 
as investors, not competitors.119  This case reinvigorated the 
 
 111. See generally Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
 112. See generally 1RUWK$P6RFFHU/HDJXHY1DW·O)RRWEDOO/HDJXH)G
(2d cir. 1982). 
 113. See generally /$0HPRULDO&ROLVHXP&RPP·QY1DW·O)RRWEDOO/HDJXH
F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984). 
 114. See Nathanial Grow, 7KHUH·V1R ´,µ LQ ´/HDJXHµ 3URIHVVLRQDO 6SRUWV /HDJXHV
and the Single Entity Defense, 105 MICH. L. REV. 183, 187 (2006).  
 115. 7KRPDV $ 3LUDLQR GHVFULEHV MRLQW YHQWXUHV DV ´D XQLTXH IRUP RI EXVLQHVV
RUJDQL]DWLRQZKLFKUHTXLUHWKHLURZQDQWLWUXVWDSSURDFKµSee Piraino, supra note 74, 
at 921.  The uniqueness, Piraino says, comes from the way in which joint ventures 
blend competition and cooperation.  Id.  As such, Piraino believes that professional 
VSRUWVOHDJXHV´SRVVHVVDOOWKHUHOHYDQWFKDUDFWHULVWLFVRIMRLQWYHQWXUHVµId. at 922.   
 116. See Texaco, Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 7 (2006).  The Texaco and Shell oil 
companies collaborated together and set a fixed price for both gasoline brands.  Id. at 1.  
In response, Texaco and Shell service station owners alleged that this price fixing 
violated antitrust law.  Id. 
 117. See Tulane University School of Law Moot Court Mardi Gras Invitational: 2009 
Competition Problem and Winning Brief, 17 SPORTS LAW J. 317, 329 (2010) (noting that 
a single entity is immune from antitrust scrutiny while a joint venture is subject to 
section 1 review);; see also Timothy R. Deckert, Multiple Characterizations for the Single 
Entity Argument?: The Seventh Circuit Throws an Airball in Chicago Professional 
Sports Limited Partnership v. National Basketball Association, 5 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. 
L.J. 73, 86 (1998) (characterizing a professional sports league as either a single entity 
subject only to sectioQRIWKH6KHUPDQ$FWRUDMRLQWYHQWXUHVXEMHFWWRVHFWLRQ·V5XOH
of Reason analysis).  
 118. Dagher, 547 U.S. at 6. 
 119. Id. at 5²6. 
DEWEY RANCH 1/31/2011  5:27 PM 
122 Seton Hall Journal of Sports and Entertainment Law [Vol. 21.1 
single entity defense, and, to address the antitrust debate 
surrounding sports leagues, the Court recently granted 
certiorari in and decided another Seventh Circuit case, 
American Needle.120   
American Needle arose after the NFL granted exclusive 
headwear rights to Reebok International Ltd.121  American 
Needle and other vendors previously had benefited from 
headwear licensing agreements with the NFL and, as a 
result, American Needle alleged that thH 1)/·V H[FOXVLYH
licensing deal with Reebok violated section 1.122  The NFL 
responded by asserting that the league was incapable of 
conspiring within the meaning of section 1 because the NFL, 
its member teams, and the National Football League 
Properties (NFLP)123 must be considered a single entity.124  
The Seventh Circuit agreed with the league and held that the 
NFL and its teams operate as a single entity for antitrust 
purposes.125  Interestingly, the NFL supported American 
1HHGOH·V SHWLWLRQ IRU FHUWLRUDUL HYHQ Whough the league had 
prevailed in the lower court, presumably to broaden the 
DSSOLFDWLRQRI WKHVLQJOHHQWLW\GHWHUPLQDWLRQ WR WKH OHDJXH·V
other activities.126  In light of Dagher, it appears that the NFL 
believed the Court was moving in the direction of finding 
professional sports leagues exempt from section 1 challenges, 
and the NFL was willing to risk an unfavorable result in 
order to have the opportunity to settle the matter in its favor 
once and for all.  The Court specifically chose to review 
American Needle to determine whether the NFL is immune 
from antitrust scrutiny under section 1.127  The oral 
arguments in American Needle were heard on January 13, 
2010, and on May 24, 2010, the Court handed down a 
decision.128  
 
 120. See $P1HHGOH ,QF Y1DW·O )RRWEDOO /HDJXH  )G  WK &LU 
cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 2859 (2009) (No. 08-­661), DII·G, 130 S. Ct. 2201 (2010).  
 121. See Am. Needle, 538 F.3d at 738. 
 122. Id. 
 123. The NFLP is a separate corporation formed by the NFL to develop, license, and 
PDUNHWWKHLQWHOOHFWXDOSURSHUW\RIWKH1)/·VWKLUW\-­two member teams.  Am. Needle, 
,QFY1DW·O)RRWEDOO/HDJXH6&W 
 124. Am. Needle, 538 F.3d at 738. 
 125. Id. at 743²44. 
 126. See generally Amicus Brief of the National Football League Coaches 
Association in Support of Petitioner, Am. Needle, 130 S. Ct. 2201 (No. 08-­661). 
 127. See Am. Needle, 538 F.3d 736, cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 2859 (2009) (No. 08-­661). 
 128. See Am. Needle, 130 S. Ct. 2201.   
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The narrow question presented in American Needle was 
ZKHWKHU WKH OLFHQVLQJ RSHUDWLRQV RI 1)/ WHDPV· LQWHOOHFWXDO
property, carried out through the NFLP, constitute concerted 
action in violation of section 1.129  In its analysis, the Court 
reviewed action by the NFL and NFLP separately.  The Court 
established that NFL teams have independent economic 
interests that inevitably lead to competition within the 
marketplace.130  This competition ranges from rivalry on the 
playing field to competition for intellectual property.131  
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice John Paul Stevens 
QRWHG WKDW ´HDFK RI WKH >1)/@ WHDPV LV D VXEVWDQWLDO
indHSHQGHQWO\ RZQHG LQGHSHQGHQWO\ PDQDJHG EXVLQHVVµ132 
DQG´ZKHQHDFK1)/WHDPOLFHQVHVLWVLQWHOOHFWXDOSURSHUW\LW
LVQRWSXUVXLQJWKH¶FRPPRQLQWHUHVWVRIWKHZKROH·OHDJXHEXW
LV LQVWHDG SXUVXLQJ LQWHUHVWV RI HDFK ¶FRUSRUDWLRQ
LWVHOI· . . . µ133  In reference to the NFLP, the Court 
determined that, although the NFLP is separate from the 
NFL, each team is still an independent decision-­making 
HQWLW\WKDWVKDUHV´MRLQWO\µ LQWKH1)/3·VPDQDJHGDVVHWV134  
Consequently, each team has the capability of manipulating 
its share of assets by acting on interests that are separate 
from the corporation as a whole.135  Simply put, the Court 
YLHZHGWKH1)/3DVPHUHO\´DQLQVWUXPHQWDOLW\µRIWKHWHDPV
and, for antitrust purposes, the Court determined that 
decisions E\ ERWK WKH 1)/ DQG 1)/3 UHJDUGLQJ WHDPV·
intellectual property amounted to concerted action within the 
meaning of section 1.136 
Based on these findings, the Court remanded the case to 
the district court with instruction to apply the Rule of Reason 
analysis.137  ,QGRLQJVR WKH&RXUW·VXQDQLPRXVGHFLVLRQKDV
established a precedent that will deter sports leagues in the 
future from asserting the single entity defense in the federal 
courts.  Jeffrey Kessler, outside counsel for the National 
 
 129. Id. at 2206²07. 
 130. Id. at 2212. 
 131. Id.  
 132. Id.  
 133. Id. at 2213 (quoting Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 
752, 770 (1984)). 
 134. See Am. Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2201, 2214. 
 135. Id. DW7KHVHGHFLVLRQVUDQJHIURP´SXUFKDVHVRIDSSDUHODQGKHDGZHDU
WRWKHJUDQWLQJRIOLFHQVHVWRXVHLWVWUDGHPDUNVµId. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 2216²17. 
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Football League Players Association (NFLPA), stated that, 
´WKH IDFW WKDW >WKH GHFLVLRQ@ LV XQDQLPRXVPHDQV WKH VLQJOH
entity argument for sports leagues is basically dead.  It means 
that the option to decertify and assert anti-­trust rights is as 
VWURQJ DV LW KDV HYHU EHHQµ138  Although the single entity 
DUJXPHQWLV´EDVLFDOO\GHDGµWKH5XOHRI5HDVRQVWLOOPXVWEH
applied to an antitrust challenge, and litigants likely will 
continue to bring their claims through the federal court 
system in the hope that a judge will apply a Rule of Reason 
analysis that is favorable to their interests.   
IV. JUDGE BAUM·S FACEOFF: A CASE OF FIRST IMPRESSION 
FOR PROFESSIONAL SPORTS TEAMS UTILIZING THE 
BANKRUPTCY COURT TO FORCE FRANCHISE SALE AND 
RELOCATION 
A. Dewey Ranch I³The Hearing 
On June 15, 2009, a hearing was held before Judge 
Redfield T. Baum in the United States Bankruptcy Court for 
the District of Arizona on the motion of the Debtors seeking 
authority to sell the Coyotes to PSE and to allow Balsillie to 
relocate the team to Canada.139  The Debtors and PSE 
asserted that the bankruptcy court could permit the sale of 
the Coyotes to PSE and authorize the relocation of the team 
from Phoenix to Canada under sections 363 and 365 of the 
Code.140  7KH1+/REMHFWHGWRWKH'HEWRUV·FODLPVEHFDXVHWKH
league had not consented to the change of ownership or the 
relocation.141  Specifically, the NHL asserted that: 1) league 
member agreements and documents pertaining to, but not 
limited to, change of ownership and relocation must be 
´DVVXPHG DQG DVVLJQHG LQ WKHLU HQWLUHW\µ  WKH SOHDGLQJV
IDLOHG WR HVWDEOLVK ´DGHTXDWH SURWHFWLRQ RI WKH OHDJXH·V
LQWHUHVWVµDQGWKHUHZDVQRHYLGHQFHRIDERQDILGHGLVSXWH
between the parties founded on antitrust claims.142  In 
addition, the league warned the court that granting the 
DebWRUV·PRWLRQZRXOG´ZUHDNKDYRFLQWKHSURIHVVLRQDOVSRUWV
 
 138. U.S. Supreme Court Overturns Ruling in American Needle Case, SPORT·S 
BUSINESS DAILY (May 24, 2010), http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/article/139547. 
 139. In re Dewey Ranch Hockey, LLC, 406 B.R. 30, 32 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2009). 
 140. Id. at 35. 
 141. Id. at 34. 
 142. Id. 
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LQGXVWU\µ143 
Judge Baum considered two key issues during this 
hearing.  The first issue was whether the court, pursuant to 
its power under section 365 of the Code, could authorize the 
assumption and DVVLJQPHQWRIWKH'HEWRUV·H[HFXWRU\FRQWUDFW
ZLWK WKH 1+/ E\ ´H[FLVLQJµ D QRQ-­transferability provision 
from the contract.144  Such authorization would bar the NHL 
IURPHQIRUFLQJLWVFRQVHQWUHTXLUHPHQWVIRUDWHDP·VFKDQJHRI
ownership and relocation.145  Second, the court considered 
whether it had the power under section 363 of the Code to sell 
the Coyotes to PSE and authorize the relocation of the 
&R\RWHV WR &DQDGD IUHH DQG FOHDU RI DQ\ FUHGLWRU·V FODLPV
LQFOXGLQJ WKH1+/·V FODLPVDQG REMHFWLRQV LI VXFK claims or 
interests were either not enforceable under nonbankruptcy 
ODZRU LQ´ERQD ILGHµGLVSXWH146  Judge Baum considered the 
LVVXHVSUHVHQWHG LQWKHPRWLRQHVSHFLDOO\´QRYHODQGXQLTXHµ
because this was the first time a professional sports team had 
sought to invoke bankruptcy law to force a sale and relocation 
of a team.147  -XGJH %DXP·V DQDO\VLV DOVR ZDV XQLTXH DQG
must be considered carefully within the context of both 
bankruptcy and antitrust law.   
1. Section 365: Assumption and Assignment 
Section 365(f)(1) of the Code authorizes the assumption 
and assignment of an executory contract148 ´QRWZLWKVWDQGLQJ
language in the executory contract . . . that prohibits, restricts 
or conditions the assignment of such contract . . . µ149  In other 
words, during bankruptcy proceedings, the judge may strike 
an anti-­assignment clause from an executory contract if it 
 
 143. Id.  The NFL, the NBA, and MLB submitted an amici curiae brief in support of 
WKH1+/·VREMHFWLRQWRWKH'HEWRUV·UHTXHVWWRVHOODQGUHORFDWHWKHWHDP%ULHIRI$PLFL
Curiae at 1²2, In re Dewey Ranch Hockey, LLC, 414 B.R. 577 (2009) (No. 277).  The 
EULHI XUJHG WKH FRXUW WR UHIUDLQ IURP DOORZLQJ IUDQFKLVHV ´WR HQOLVW LQ WKH DLG RI WKH
bankruptcy courts in an effort to circumvent established league rules that govern such 
OHDJXH GHFLVLRQVµ EHFDXVH VXFK DFWLRQ ZRXOG SRWHQWLDOO\ ´XQGHUPLQH WKH EXVLQHVV RI
SURIHVVLRQDOKRFNH\DQGRWKHUPDMRUOHDJXHVSRUWVµId. at 6.  
 144. In re Dewey Ranch, 406 B.R. at 36.  
 145. Id.  
 146. Id. at 38.  
 147. Id. at 35.  
 148. Executory contracts include contracts that have not been completely performed.  
1 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1:19 (4th ed. 2007). 
 149. 11 U.S.C. § 365 (2006). 
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harms creditors by preventing a debtor from realizing the full 
value of assets.150  Generally speaking, section 365 allows a 
debtor to effectively undergo reorganization without regard to 
contract provisions that could otherwise inhibit the debtor 
from rehabilitation.151   
In Dewey Ranch I, the Debtors argued that the assumption 
and assignment of the contract to PSE was permissible under 
section 365 because the requirement to play in Glendale was 
an unlawful anti-­assignment provision that could be 
ignored.152  The Debtors seemingly invoked this section of the 
Code in the hope that the bankruptcy court would authorize 
the sale and relocation of the team notwithstanding absence 
RI WKH 1+/·V FRQVHQW  %DQNUXSWF\ ODZ KRZHYHU GRHV QRW
allow the assumption and assignment of only the benefits of 
the contract.153  Rather, the assuming party must undertake 
both the benefits and the burdens of the entire agreement.154   
The NHL stressed this concept of assumption in a pleading 
filed with the court on June 5, 2009, stating that the 
´DVVXPSWLRQ RI H[HFXWRU\ FRQWUDFWV VXFK DV WKH&RQVWLWXWLRQ
and Bylaws . .  UHTXLUHV DVVXPSWLRQ LQ HQWLUHO\ ¶FXP RQHUH·
or subject to all burGHQVµ155  The NHL argued that the 
Coyotes were simply using the bankruptcy court to select 
which contract provisions the team was willing to honor and, 
WKHUHIRUH ´VLGHGRRUµ LWVZD\ LQWRWKH OHDJXH156  In addition, 
WKH 1+/ QRWHG WKDW WKH OHDJXH·V &RQVWLWXWLon and Bylaws 
grant member franchises the right to participate in the league 
and, by forcing a sale conditioned on the rejection of these 
GRFXPHQWVWKHSURSRVHGWUDQVDFWLRQZRXOGDWPRVW´WUDQVIHU
a collection of used hockey equipment³none of which could 
 
 150. See 3-­365 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 365.08[2] (15th ed. rev. 2007);; see also 
Nicholas Georgakopoulos, Bankruptcy Law for Productivity, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
51, 53 (2002).  
 151. See Timothy D. Cedrone, A Critical Analysis of Sport Organization 
Bankruptcies in the United States and England: Does Bankruptcy Law Explain the 
Disparity in Number of Cases?, 18 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 297, 311 (2008). 
 152. In re Dewey Ranch, 406 B.R. at 36. 
 153. COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 150´>7@KHWUXVWHHPXVWHLWKHU
assume the entire contract, cum onere, or reject the entire contract, shedding 
REOLJDWLRQVDVZHOODVEHQHILWVµ 
 154.  Id.  
 155. 1DWLRQDO+RFNH\/HDJXH·V2EMHFWLRQWRWKH'HEWRU·V5HTXHVWWR6HOOWKH3KRHQL[
Coyotes Under Sections 365 and 363 of the Bankruptcy Code at 8, In re Dewey Ranch 
Hockey, LLC, 414 B.R. 577 %DQNU ' $UL]  1R  >KHUHLQDIWHU 1+/·V
Objection]. 
 156. Id. at 8. 
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EHDU WKH1+/ ORJRµ157  In his analysis of section 365, Judge 
%DXP FRQVLGHUHG WKH$3$·V RZQHUVKLS WHUPV DQG UHORFDWLRQ
provision separately. 
i. Ownership Terms 
The controlling precedent in In re Crow Winthrop158 
ZHLJKHG KHDYLO\ LQ -XGJH %DXP·V DQDO\VLV RI RZQHUship 
terms.  In Crow Winthrop, the Ninth Circuit invalidated a 
contract ownership provision under section 365(f) by looking 
beyond the wording of the provision to decide if it was a de 
facto anti-­assignment clause.159  While Judge Baum 
recognized that many courts rely on section 365(f) to prevent 
the enforcement of contract terms that bar assignment, he 
considered the Coyotes case to be different because the NHL 
had previously approved PSE as a member of the NHL in 
2006.160  The court felt that, absent the relocation provision, 
the NHL would not object based on ownership, and the court 
specifically cited the lack of evidence of any material changes 
WR 36(·V FLUFXPVWDQFHV VLQFH EHLQJ SUHYLRXVO\ DSSURYHG E\
the league.161  Accordingly, the court concluded that the NHL 
could not object or withhold its consent to PSE becoming the 
controlling owner of the Coyotes and, therefore, could not 
declare a default of the terms of the APA based solely on the 
ownership terms.162  7KHFRXUWKDG´WKHILUPVHQVHWKDWLIWKH
only issue here was PSE purchasing the Phoenix Coyotes [no 
UHORFDWLRQ WHUP@ WKHUHZRXOG EH QR REMHFWLRQ IURP WKH1+/µ
and, as a result, Judge Baum found that the ownership 
provision was not an unenforceable de facto anti-­assignment 
under section 365.163   
ii. Relocation Provision 
1H[W -XGJH %DXP FRQVLGHUHG ZKHWKHU WKH $3$·V
relocation provision was unenforceable as a de facto anti-­
 
 157. Id. at 2. 
 158. In re &URZ:LQWKURS2SHUDWLQJ3·VKLS)GWK&LU 
 159. Id. at 1124. 
 160. In re Dewey Ranch Hockey, LLC, 406 B.R. 30, 36 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2009) 
 161. Id.  
 162. Id.  
 163. Id. at 36²37. 
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assignment under section 365.164  In his analysis, Judge Baum 
invoked section 365(b)(1)(C) requiring adequate assurance of 
future performance.165  Under this section of the Code, the 
Chapter 11 debtor must provide adequate protection of future 
SHUIRUPDQFH ZKLFK PD\ LQFOXGH ´VXIILFLHQW ILQDQFLDO
backing . . . or other similar forms of security or guaranty, or 
HYHQ SURPLVHVµ166  In interpreting this requirement, Judge 
%DXPVXJJHVWHGWKDWWKH'HEWRUV·DJUHHPHQWZLWKWKH1+/
requiring the Coyotes to play all home games in Glendale, fell 
within this section.167  Judge Baum pointed out that 
fundamental bankruptcy law requires an assuming party to 
assume both the benefits and burdens of the entire 
agreement, thereby precluding the party from picking and 
choosing what aspects of the contract will be adopted.168  
Although the Debtors and PSE claimed that the location 
requirement could be excised from the contract under 
365(f)(1) because it restrained the assignment, Judge Baum 
rejected their arguments in the absence of bankruptcy court 
decisions ordering relocation of the geographic magnitude 
SURSRVHGLQWKH&R\RWHV·VFDVH169  As a result, the court could 
not find the relocation provision to be a term prohibiting, 
restricting or conditioning the assignment of the agreement in 
violation of 365(f)(1) and ruled that relocation conditional on 
league approval could not be excised from the contract under 
section 365.170  
2. Section 363: A Sale Free and Clear 
While Judge Baum also considered whether the court 
could authorize the sale and relocation of the team under 
section 363 of the Code, he ultimately declined to rule on the 
legal merits of this issue.  Section 363 allows a bankruptcy 
court to authorize a sale free and clear of claims171 and 
 
 164. Id.   
 165. Id. at 37;; 11 U.S.C. § 365 (2006).  
 166. In re Gold Standard at Penn, Inc., 75 B.R. 669, 674 (E.D. Pa. 1987). 
 167. In re Dewey Ranch, 406 B.R. at 37.  
 168. Id.  
 169. Id.  
 170. Id.   
 171. 7KHDEVHQFHRIWKHZRUG´FODLPVµLQ6HFWLRQILVFRPPRQO\LJQRUHGVRVDOHV
free and clear of claims are routine.  See George W. Kuney, Bankruptcy and Recovery of 
Tort Damages, 71 TENN. L. REV. 81, 92 (2003).  
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interests,172 thereby discharging the rights of creditors that 
would otherwise exist.173  The Debtors and PSE claimed that 
the veto rights of the NHL contained in the NHL Constitution 
and Bylaws DUH ´LQWHUHVWVµ XQGHU WKH&RGH DQG DUJXHG WKDW
the bankruptcy court could authorize the sale and relocation 
RI WKH&R\RWHV´IUHHDQGFOHDURI WKHJHRJUDSKLF OLPLWDWLRQLQ
the agreements and notwithstanding the objection . . . of the 
1+/µ174  In particular, the Debtors and PSE invoked sections 
363(f)(1) and 363(f)(4) and claimed that the antitrust 
allegations asserted in the adversarial proceeding satisfied 
HLWKHURUERWKRIWKHSURYLVLRQV·UHTXLUHPHQWV175  As a result, 
Judge Baum analyzed these section 363 requirements 
through an overlay of antitrust case law involving the 
relocation of professional sports teams. 
i. Section 363(f)(4) 
6HFWLRQIDOORZVDVDOH IUHHDQGFOHDUZKHUH ´VXFK
LQWHUHVW LV LQ ERQD ILGH GLVSXWHµ176  This section allows 
productive assets subject to prolonged litigation to be 
transferred to a third party and enables the asset to remain 
profitable.177  In essence, it allows title to be cleared when the 
asset is subject to dispute.178  Legislative history addressing 
the underlying considerations for this section of the Code cites 
concerns that creditors could use involuntary bankruptcy as 
an instrument to force a debtor to pay certain debts when, in 
fact, the debtor may be shielded by legitimate defenses.179  In 
addition, prolonged litigation involving a valuable asset may 
LQWHUIHUH ZLWK WKH EDQNUXSWF\ FRXUW·V SULPDU\ REMHFWLYHV RI
creating a fund of assets to satisfy creditors in a timely 
 
 172. 7KHWHUP´LQWHUHVWµLVQRWGHILQHGLQWKH&RGHId.  
 173. 11 U.S.C. § 363 (2006). 
 174. In re Dewey Ranch  %5 DW  'HEWRUV· 0HPRUDQGXP RI 3RLQWV DQG
$XWKRULWLHVLQ6XSSRUWRI0RWLRQWR6HOO6XEVWDQWLDOO\DOORI&R\RWHV+RFNH\·V$VVHWVDW
7, In re Dewey Ranch Hockey, LLC, 414 B.R. 577 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2009) (No. 288) 
>KHUHLQDIWHU'HEWRUV·0HPRUDQGXPRI Points].  
 175. In re Dewey Ranch, 406 B.R. at 38. 
 176. § 363. 
 177. See Kuney, supra note 171, at 95. 
 178. Id. at 96.  
 179. See Jane C. Fennelly & Scott E. Blakeley, Current Developments in Involuntary 
Bankruptcy Filings, in REAL ESTATE WORKOUTS AND BANKRUPTCIES, at 510²11 (PLI 
Real Estate Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. N4-­4574, 1993) (citing S. 
7618, 98th Cong. 2d Sess., June 1984).   
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manner or the preservation of going-­concern value through 
reorganization.180 
In Dewey Ranch I, the purported bona fide dispute was 
founded on antitrust claims.  In particular, the Debtors 
DUJXHG WKDW WKH 1+/·V YHWR ULJKWV RWKHUZLVH FRQVWUXHG DV
´LQWHUHVWVµ XQGHU WKH &RGH ZHUH LQ ERQD ILGH GLVSXWH RQ
account of the asserted antitrust claims in the pending 
adversary proceeding.181  The Debtors alleged that their 
DQWLWUXVW FODLPV ZHUH ´ULSHµ IRU DGMXGLFDWLRQ DQG VKRXOG EH
considered by the court in its 363 analysis because section 16 
RIWKH&OD\WRQ$FWJUDQWV´>D@Q\SHUVRQ ILUPFRUSRUDWLRQRU
association . . . [redress] to sue for and have injunctive 
relief . . . against threatened loss or damage by a violation of 
WKH DQWLWUXVW ODZVµ182  In response, the NHL argued that it 
must actually apply its consent rights in an unlawful way to 
provide a basis for an antitrust challenge.183  At the time of 
the hearing, the NHL had not applied any ownership or 
relocation restraints and, therefore, the league claimed that 
WKH'HEWRUV·DQWLWUXVWFODLPVZHUHSUHPDWXUH184   
Assuming that the adversary proceeding was ripe for 
adjudication, WKH'HEWRUV DUJXHG WKDW WKH1+/·V ´LQWHUHVWVµ
were subject to a bona fide dispute because, as applied, the 
interests violate section 1 of the Sherman Act.185  In reaching 
this conclusion, the Debtors relied on Ninth Circuit authority 
supporting the propositLRQ WKDW ´VSRUWV OHDJXHV GR QRW
constitute a single enterprise but, rather, are separate 
HQWLWLHV ZKLFK DUH FDSDEOH RI FRQVSLULQJZLWK HDFK RWKHUµ186  
Citing Raiders IWKH'HEWRUVQRWHGWKDW´DJUHHPHQW>V@DPRQJ
competitors to fix prices or divide market territories are 
presumed illegal under section 1 because they give 
 
 180. See John D. Ayer et al., An Overview of the Automatic Stay, 22-­10 AM. BANKR. 
INST. J. 16, 16 (2004).  
 181. 'HEWRUV·0HPRUDQGXPRI3RLQWVsupra note 174, at 5. 
 182. Id. at 17 (emphasis added).  The Debtors also cited Sullivan v. National 
Football League and emphasized that a professional sports team may not be denied 
standing solely because the league has yet to make a determination regarding the 
WHDP·VGHPDQGId.;; see also 6XOOLYDQY1DW·O)RRWEDOO/HDJXH)GVW
&LU  QRWLQJ WKDW ´WKHUH LV FHUWDLQO\ QR EODQNHW UHTXLUHPHQW DV WKH 1)/
maintains . . . that Sullivan must call for a vote and obtain an official refusal from the 
1)/µ 
 183. 1+/·V2bjection, supra note 155, at 21 (emphasis added).  
 184. Id.  
 185. 'HEWRUV·0HPRUDQGXPRI3RLQWVsupra note 174, at 22. 
 186. Id. at 23.  
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competitors the ability to charge unreasonable and arbitrary 
prices instead of setting prices by virtue of free market 
IRUFHVµ187  7KH 'HEWRUV IXUWKHU FODLPHG WKDW WKH 1+/·V
ownership and relocation restrictions were unreasonable and 
unenforceable under the Rule of Reason because, as the only 
SURGXFHURIPDMRUOHDJXHLFHKRFNH\WKH1+/KDV´VLJQLILFDQW
market power and is able to act like a cartel, dividing 
territories and charging arbitrary prices completely divorced 
IURP IUHH PDUNHW IRUFHVµ188  The Debtors argued that any 
procompetitive business rationale was at best de minimis and 
that, therefore, the NHL could not demonstrate sufficient 
justification for the anticompetitive effects of its ownership 
and relocation provisions.189  
In deciding whether the antitrust claims amounted to a 
bona fide dispute, Judge Baum cited the objective test set out 
in In re Vortex Fishing Systems.190  This test requires a court 
to determine whether there is an objective basis for a 
dispute.191  Finding that the claims at issue there were subject 
to a bona fide dispute, the court in Vortex Fishing Systems 
referred to the significant factual and legal history of the 
dispute.192  After examining the facts in Dewey Ranch I, 
however, Judge Baum concluded that there was no factual or 
legal history to establish a bona fide dispute that would 
permit the sale.193  The court observed that establishing an 
antitrust violation in the setting of a sports league is very 
factually driven anGWKDW ´PRUH >ZDV@QHHGHGµ WR HVWDEOLVKD
bona fide dispute on antitrust grounds.194  The court also was 
unwilling to put pressure on the NHL to make a decision on 
 
 187. Id. DW  FLWLQJ /$0HP·O &ROLVHXP &RPP·Q Y 1DW·O )RRWEDOO /HDJXH 
F.2d 1381, 1392 (9th Cir. 1984)).  
 188. Id. at 25.  The Debtors warned the court that the denial of relocation would 
FRQVHTXHQWO\ LQFUHDVH WKH7RURQWR0DSOH/HDI·VPDUNHW SRZHU DQG WKHUHE\DOORZ WKH
team to continue charging unreasonable ticket fees.  Id.  Alternatively, the Debtors 
noted that allowing the team to relocate to Hamilton would likely increase live game 
attendance and increase television viewership and ratings.  Id. at 27²28. 
 189. Id. at 30. 
 190. In re Dewey Ranch Hockey, LLC, 406 B.R. 30, 39 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2009) (citing 
Liberty Tool & Mfg v. Vortex Fishing Sys., Inc. (In re Vortex Fishing Sys.), 277 F.3d 
1057 (9th Cir. 2002)). 
 191. Id. 
 192. See generally In re Vortex, 277 F.3d 1057. 
 193. In re Dewey Ranch, 406 B.R. at 39. 
 194. Id. at 40.  Judge Baum did not specify what would have been enough to 
establish a bona fide dispute.  Id.  
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the relocation request and force a bona fide dispute.195  In 
taking this approach, Judge Baum seemed implicitly to hold 
that it is not a violation of antitrust law for professional 
sports leagues to impose terms and conditions relating to the 
relocation of member teams.196 
ii. Section 363(f)(1) 
6HFWLRQIDOVRDOORZVDVDOHIUHHDQGFOHDURIRWKHU·V 
LQWHUHVWZKHUH´DSSOLFDEOHQRQEDQNUXSWF\ODZSHUPLWVVDOHRI
VXFK SURSHUW\ IUHH DQG FOHDU RI VXFK LQWHUHVWµ197  While the 
Debtors and PSE argued that the applicable nonbankruptcy 
law³antitrust law³MXVWLILHG WKH &R\RWHV·V VDOH DQG
relocation, Judge Baum remained uncertain.198  The court 
gave great weight to the fact that the Debtors and PSE had 
failed to assert the antitrust claims before the filing of the 
antitrust action on May 7, 2009.199  Judge Baum relied on 
Sullivan v. National Football League, where the court 
remanded the case for a new trial because the plaintiff had 
failed to request a vote by the NFL that was critically 
important to the case.200  Judge Baum similarly refused to 
construe any action by the NHL as a violation of antitrust law 
because, at the time of the hearing, the league had not made a 
decision about the relocation of the Coyotes.201  Consistent 
with these findings, the court held that the applicable 
nonbankruptcy law³antitrust law³did not permit a sale of 
the franchise assets as a matter of law and denied the 
'HEWRUV·PRWLRQWRDXWKRUL]HWKHDVVXPSWLRQDQGDVVLJQPHQW
of the executory contract.202 
3. -XGJH%DXP·V)DXOW\6HFWLRQ$QDO\VLV 
$ FORVH H[DPLQDWLRQ RI -XGJH %DXP·V UHDVRQLQJ XQGHU
section 363 reveals a faulty analysis.  The determination of 
applicable nonbankruptcy law³antitrust law³under section 
 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. at 39. 
 197. 11 U.S.C. § 363 (2006). 
 198. In re Dewey Ranch, 406 B.R. at 39.  
 199. Id.  
 200. 6XOOLYDQY1DW·O)RRWEDOO/HDJXH)GVW&LU 
 201. In re Dewey Ranch, 406 B.R. at 40. 
 202. Id.  
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363(f)(1) requires a separate analysis from the determination 
of a bona fide dispute under section 363(f)(4).  Section 363(f) 
reads as follows:  
The trustee may sell . . . free and clear of an interest . . . [including 
a lien] of an entity other than the estate only if³  
(1) applicable nonbankruptcy law permits sale of such 
property free and clear of such interest;;  
(2) such entity consents;;  
(3) such interest is a lien and the price at which such property 
is to be sold is greater than the aggregate value of all liens on 
such property;;  
(4) such interest is in bona fide dispute;; or  
(5) such entity could be compelled, in a legal or equitable 
proceedLQJWRDFFHSWDPRQH\VDWLVIDFWLRQRIVXFKLQWHUHVWµ203   
According to the wording in this section of the Code, a sale 
is permitted if any one of the five circumstances exists.204   
In the context of the Dewey Ranch decisions, a court 
should allow a sale if applicable nonbankruptcy law permits it 
or if there is a bona fide dispute.205  Although Judge Baum 
addressed both sections 363(f)(1) and 363(f)(4) as tightly 
sealed compartments without any interdependence, he relied 
on the same actions of the Debtors in failing to assert an 
antitrust action in what the court considered to be a timely 
manner and the same actions of the NHL in failing to make a 
decision on the relocation in arriving at his conclusions 
regarding both sections of 363.206  In so doing, Judge Baum 
failed to assess the applicability of nonbankruptcy law³
antitrust law³through a legal analysis.  Although the 
question of whether there is a bona fide dispute between the 
parties may be appropriate for a factual analysis based upon 
the actions of the parties as evidence of a controversy, the 
question of whether there is applicable nonbankruptcy law to 
permit the sale of the team should not depend upon when or 
how the parties asserted their allegations.  Nonbankruptcy 
law is either applicable under a legal analysis or it is not.  In 
analyzing both sections 363(f)(1) and 363(f)(4) in this factual 
 
 203. 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 204. See id.  
 205. See § 363(f)(1), (4). 
 206. In re Dewey Ranch, 406 B.R. at 39²40. 
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rather than legal manner, Judge Baum effectively diminished 
the importance of applicable nonbankruptcy law and 
circumvented the antitrust issues. 
B. The Bidding War 
At a hearing on June 22, 2009, the court scheduled two 
auctions.207  The first, scheduled for August 5 and continued to 
September 10, was a Glendale-­only auction where the court 
would consider only bids from parties who were committed to 
keeping the team in Glendale.208  The second auction, also 
scheduled for September 10, was open to all bidders.209  
On July 6, 2009, the court set forth the bidding 
procedures.210  One procedure required all bidders to file 
change of ownership/relocation applications with the NHL for 
assessment by an ordered deadline.211  After PSE submitted 
its change of ownership/relocation application, the NHL 
Board of Directors voted unanimously to reject it because 
%DOVLOOLHODFNHGWKH´FKDUDFWHUDQGLQWHJULW\µRIDPRGHO1+/
owner that is requisite under NHL By-­Law 35.212  The Board 
later provided the court with a memorandum specifying why 
LW GHQLHG 36(·V DSSOLFDWLRQ213  In particular, the Board 
H[SUHVVHG FRQFHUQ ZLWK %DOVLOOLH·V ´LQWHJULW\ DQG ZLOOLQJQHVV
WREHDJRRGSDUWQHUµDQGWKHPHPRUDQGXPOisted issues such 
DV%DOVLOOLH·VFRQGXFWLQSULRUGHDOLQJVZLWKWKH3HQJXLQVDQG
Predators and in his current attempt to purchase the 
Coyotes.214  
After the only other potential bidders announced that they 
would not submit bids to keep the Coyotes in Glendale, the 
 
 207. In re Dewey Ranch Hockey, LLC, 414 B.R. 577, 582 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2009). 
 208. Id. at 582²85. 
 209. Id. at 582. 
 210. Id.  
 211. Id.  
 212. Id. at 583.  
 213. In re Dewey Ranch, 414 B.R. at 583. 
 214. Id. at 582²84.  According to the Board, during the Penguins transactions, 
Balsillie pledged that he would keep the team in Pittsburgh and that the NHL would 
have the right to buy back the team at the selling price if he attempted to relocate the 
team.  Id. at 583.  Regarding the Predators transactions, the Board alleged that 
Balsillie tried to devalue the Predators, negotiated in bad faith, and made threats 
UHJDUGLQJWKH&DQDGLDQ%XUHDXRI&RPSHWLWLRQ ´&%&µ  Id. at 583²84.  In 2007, the 
&%&SHUIRUPHGDQLQYHVWLJDWLRQRIWKH1+/·VUXOHVDQGSURFHGXUHVDQGLQUHIHUHQFHWR
the dealings wLWK WKH 3HQJXLQV DQG 3UHGDWRUV WKH &%& GHWHUPLQHG WKDW WKH1+/·V
guidelines were lawful.  Id. at 582. 
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NHL stepped in and submitted a bid on the last day of the 
court-­ordered procedures.215  7KH1+/´UHOXFWDQWO\FRQFOXGHG
that it should make its bid because doing so was in the best 
interests of the NHL, the Coyotes, Glendale, and the 
FUHGLWRUVµ216  Prior to the September 10 auction, the NHL and 
PSE submitted their final bids.217  7KH 1+/·V ELG ZDV
 ZKLFK LQFOXGHG  SDLG WR ´VSHFLILF
FXUH FRVWV DQG WUDGH FUHGLWRUVµ218  36(·V ILQDO ELG ZDV
$212,500,000, and the bid would have increased to 
 LI *OHQGDOH KDG DFFHSWHG 36(·V RIIHU RI
 WR ZLWKGUDZ WKH FLW\·V REMHFWLRQ WR WKH VDOH WR
PSE.219  As a practical matter, bankruptcy judges utilize the 
auction process to bring parties together in order to effectuate 
sales.220  In this case, however, Judge Baum appears to have 
EHHQ ´RYHUO\ RSWLPLVWLFµ LQ WKLQNLQJ WKDW D ELG FRXOG VDWLVI\
ERWKWKH'HEWRUV·´HFRQRPLFQHHGVµDQGWKH1+/·V´RSHUDWLQJ
FRQFHUQVµ221 
C. Dewey Ranch II³Disposition of the Team 
Sale/Relocation 
36(·VHIIRUWWREX\DQG relocate the Coyotes to Canada was 
officially put to rest in the hearing before Judge Baum on 
September 30, 2009.222  Prior to the hearing, the parties 
submitted documents articulating their positions regarding 
the sale and relocation of the Coyotes.223  PSE and the Debtors 
argued that it was unfair to allow the NHL to bid on the team 
VLQFHWKHOHDJXH·V´LQVLGHUVWDWXVµZRXOGIDYRUWKH1+/·VELG
RYHU 36(·V ELG224  7KH SDUWLHV DOVR UHIHUHQFHG WKH 1+/·V
 
 215. Id. at 585.  The prospective bidders, The Reinsdorf Group and Ice Edge, 
previously had announced that they would keep the Coyotes in Glendale, but both 
groups later retracted their intention to bid on the team.  Id. 
 216. Id. at 585.  
 217. Id. at 587. 
 218. Id. at 588.  This amount also covered all unsecured creditors with the exclusion 
of Moyes and Wayne Gretzky.  Id. at 585²86. 
 219. In re Dewey Ranch, 414 B.R. at 587.  
 220. See Andrew P. DeNatale, Bankruptcy Guide 2010, in NUTS AND BOLTS OF 
CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY 2010, at 166 (PLI Comm. Law & Practicing Course Handbook 
Series No. 23359, 2010). 
 221. Alan S. Glover & Ian J. Silverbrand, Phoenix Coyotes Bankruptcy Can Still Be 
Model for Troubled Sports Franchises, 27 ENT. & SPORTS LAW 4, 4 (2009). 
 222. In re Dewey Ranch, 414 B.R. at 577. 
 223. Id.   
 224. Id. DW  Q  36( DQG WKH'HEWRUV DUJXHG WKDW WKH1+/ZDV DQ ´LQVLGHUµ
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´FRQIOLFW RI LQWHUHVWµ LQ GHFLGLQJ ZKHWKHU %DOVLOOLH ZDV DQ
acceptable applicant when the NHL planned to submit its 
own bid for the team.225  Furthermore, PSE and the Debtors 
DVVHUWHG WKDW WKH1+/DFWHG LQEDG IDLWKE\ UHMHFWLQJ36(·V
bid without proper consideration, by making its own bid for 
the team and by trying to protect the veto rights of the 
Toronto Maple Leafs.226  Consistent with their arguments at 
the June 15 hearing, however, the crux of PSE and the 
'HEWRUV· FODLPVZDV WKDW WKH EDQNUXSWF\ FRXUW VKRXOG RUGHU
the sale of the Coyotes to PSE and authorize the teDP·V
relocation to Hamilton based on sections 363 and 365 of the 
Code.227   
The NHL opposed these claims and argued, among other 
things, that sections 363 and 365 did not authorize the sale 
and relocation of the Coyotes.228  The NHL contended that the 
court had no basis to relocate the team under section 365 
because the provision in the executory contract requiring the 
Coyotes to play all home games in Glendale could not be 
ignored and excised from the agreement.229  The NHL also 
asserted that it did not act in bad faith and, rather, justifiably 
GHQLHG 36(·V DSSOLFDWLRQ230  In addition, the NHL claimed 
that the team could not be sold free and clear under section 
EHFDXVH36(·VELGFRXOGQRWDGHTXDWHO\SURWHFWWKH1+/·V
interests as mandated by section 363(e).231  Section 363(e) 
states that, when selling property under section 363, a court 
´VKDOOSURKLELWRUFRQGLWLRQVXFK . . . sale . . . as is necessary to 
provide adequate protection [to the interests of the 
SDUWLHV@µ232  Judge Baum addressed some of these claims and 
the bids of both PSE and the NHL to purchase the Coyotes.233  
 
because the NHL (1) had been approved by the court as a lender to the debtors based on 
WKH WHDP·V RSHUDWLQJ ORVVHV ZDV JLYHQ MRLQW FRQWURO E\ WKH FRXUW RYHU WKHGHEWRUV·
RSHUDWLRQGXHWRWKH1+/·VORDQVWRWKHGHEWRUVDQGDVVXPHGWKHUROHDVDELGGHURI
the Coyotes.  Id. 
 225. Id, at 588. 
 226. Id.  PSE and the Debtors presented a letter by Bettman stating, in part, that 
´WKH0DSOH/HDIV UHVHUYHDOO ULJKWV WR WDNHZKDWHYHUDFWLRQVDUHQHFHVVDU\ WRSURWHFW
WKHLUH[FOXVLYHULJKWVWRWKHLUKRPHWHUULWRU\µId. at 589.   
 227. Id. at 589.   
 228. In re Dewey Ranch, 414 B.R. at 589. 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id.  
 231. Id.  
 232. 11 U.S.C. § 363 (2006). 
 233. In re Dewey Ranch, 414 B.R. at 587²93. 
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8OWLPDWHO\ WKH FRXUW GHQLHG 36(·V ELG ZLWK SUHMXGLFH DQG
GHQLHG WKH1+/·VELGZLWKRXWSUHMXGLFH234  In making those 
determinations, Judge Baum addressed concepts of antitrust 
law but avoided making legal determinations on those issues. 
Although the court analyzed section 365 of the Code 
prohibiting de facto anti-­assignment clauses at length in 
Dewey Ranch I, Judge Baum avoided this issue in Dewey 
Ranch II and focused his analysis on section 363.  Judge 
Baum refused to decide the merits of the many factual and 
legal issues raised by the parties and, instead, assumed that, 
for the purposes of his analysis, the interests of the NHL were 
subject to a bona fide dispute.235  In reaching these findings, it 
was unnecessary for the court to indulge in a specific legal 
analysis of the antitrust issues.  The court, however, chose to 
address the antitrust issues at some length within the context 
of section 363, and that discussion raises issues about the 
FRXUW·s decision and its implications for similar bankruptcy 
proceedings in the future. 
In particular, Judge Baum placed significant weight on 
section 363(e) of the Code.236  Although section 363(f) does not 
mention in its text the adequate protection of interests 
afforded under section 363(e), section 363(f) is nonetheless 
subject to its requirements.237  In essence, section 363(e) is a 
´VDIHW\ QHWµ WKDW JXDUDQWHHV DGHTXDWH SUotection of the 
interests involved.238  After discussing the language of section 
363(e) and noting that the bankruptcy court has the 
discretion to prohibit or control a proposed sale if the interests 
at issue are not adequately protected, the court went on to 
compare the relative ease in protecting economic interests 
ZLWKWKHGLIILFXOW\RISURWHFWLQJWKH1+/·VRWKHULQWHUHVWVWKH
FRXUW FRQFOXGHG WKDW WKH ODWWHU ZDV ´H[FHHGLQJO\ PRUH
FKDOOHQJLQJµ239  Although the Debtors and PSE argued that 
the NHL could be adequately protected through payment of a 
suitable relocation fee that was required by the NHL 
Constitution and applicable precedent,240 Judge Baum firmly 
 
 234. Id. at 593. 
 235. Id. at 590. 
 236. Id. at 590²91.  
 237. See Daniel J. Ferretti, Eviction Without Rejection, 39 CUMB. L. REV. 707, 712 
(2009).  
 238. Id.  
 239. In re Dewey Ranch, 414 B.R. at 591.  
 240. See /$0HP·O&ROLVHXP&RPP·Q Y1DW·O)RRWEDOO/HDJXH)G
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disagreed.241   
Judge Baum was especially concerned that a decision 
SHUPLWWLQJ WKH WHDP·V VDOH DQG UHORFDWLon would negatively 
impact the NHL in the future if, after the Coyotes moved to 
Canada, the NHL ultimately prevailed in litigation.242  He 
stated that, by that point, the team would already have been 
moved and the NHL would be denied the ability to prohibit 
the relocation.243  Lastly, Judge Baum noted the absence of 
FDVH ODZ SHUWDLQLQJ WR WKH ´VKDOO SURKLELW . . . such sale 
ODQJXDJHRIVHFWLRQHµ244  %DVHGRQKLV´ILUPVHQVHµWKDW
the case was subject to section 363(e), however, Judge Baum 
ultimately exerciVHGKLVGLVFUHWLRQDQGGHQLHG36(·VELGZLWK
prejudice.245   
7KHHIIHFWRI-XGJH%DXP·VDQDO\VLVLVHVVHQWLDOO\WRDOORZ
section 363(e), which requires adequate protection of 
interests, to trump other provisions that would allow for a 
sale free and clear of claims and interests.  Section 363(e), 
KRZHYHUVWDWHVWKDWWKHFRXUWVKDOO´SURKLELWµRU´FRQGLWLRQµD
sale in order to adequately protect the interests of the 
parties.246  Therefore, under the language of section 363(e), 
Judge Baum could have allowed the sale under section 
363(f)(1) or 363(f)(4) with the requirement that it be 
FRQGLWLRQHG RQ WHUPV WKDW ZRXOG SURWHFW WKH SDUWLHV· EHVW
interests.  If section 363(e) were applied in this manner, it 
would not have acted as a trump to the other section 363 
provisions and, in turn, it would have allowed for the 
flexibility that the Code seems to anticipate by the language 
´SURKLELWµRU´FRQGLWLRQµ 
7KH FRXUW FRQFOXGHG LWV RSLQLRQ E\ DQDO\]LQJ WKH 1+/·V
bid.  The court found the bid to be defective because it allowed 
the NHL to choose which unsecured creditors would be paid 
with the sale proceeds.247  As a result, the court denied the 
 
(9th Cir. 1986) (requiring antitrust damages after a football stadium suffered from 
HFRQRPLF ORVV IROORZLQJ WKH 1)/·V HIIRUWV WR SUHYHQW WKH 2DNODQG 5DLGHUV IURP
relocating to Los Angeles).  
 241. In re Dewey Ranch, 414 B.R. at 591. 
 242. Id. 
 243. Id.  
 244. Id.  
 245. Id. at 591²93. 
 246. 11 U.S.C. § 363 (2006). 
 247. In re Dewey Ranch, 414 B.R. at 593.  The bid was structured to pay all secured 
creditors and most unsecured creditors in full, excluding any claims by Jerry Moyes or 
Wayne Gretzky, who had the largest stake in the ownership group.  Id. at 585²86. 
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1+/·V ELG ZLWKRXW SUHMXGLFH DQG LQYLWHG WKH 1+/ WR FRPH
back with a follow-­up bid.248  The NHL amended its bid and, 
on November 2, 2009, Judge Baum signed an order approving 
the sale to the NHL.249   
V. A NEW GAME IN TOWN? 
A. -XGJH%DXP·V'H)DFWR$QWLWUXVW5XOLQJ 
-XGJH%DXPVWDWHGLQWKH6HSWHPEHUKHDULQJWKDW´WKH
court need not and will not make any decision on the merits of 
the many factual and legal issues raised by all of the 
SDUWLHVµ250  By including an extensive discussion of antitrust 
issues and relevant expert testimony in his opinion, however, 
Judge Baum appears to have reached a de facto antitrust 
decision.  After Dewey Ranch I, when the court had disposed 
RI36(·VPRWLRQDQGKDGVFKHGXOHGWKHDXFWLRQDOOWKDW-XGJH
Baum had to do in Dewey Ranch II ZDV WR GHQ\ 36(·V ELG
based upon all the reasons articulated in Dewey Ranch I and 
WR IROORZ WKDW E\ H[DPLQLQJ WKH 1+/·V ELG DQG GHFLGLQJ
whether that bid was acceptable.  
The court did not follow that simple route that would have 
been predicated on considerations of judicial economy.  
Instead, the court went into a lengthy discussion regarding 
KRZWKH1+/·VLQWHUHVWVZRXOGQRWEHDGHTXDWHO\SUotected if 
WKH FRXUW DFFHSWHG 36(·V ELG251  In particular, Judge Baum 
DJUHHGZLWKWKH1+/WKDWWKHOHDJXHKDV´WKHULJKWWRFRQWURO
ZKHUHLWVPHPEHUVSOD\WKHLUKRPHKRFNH\JDPHVµDQGWKDW
such an interest requires adequate protection.252  Judge 
%DXP·V GLVFXVVLRQ DOVR SRVLWLYHO\ GHVFULEHG WKH 1+/·V
LQWHUHVWV LQ WHUPV RI ´FRQWUROµ DQG ´UHVWULFWLRQVµ253  For 
H[DPSOH KH VDLG WKDW WKH OHDJXH·V LQWHUHVW LQ controlling 
where members play their home games is essential because 
´WKH YHU\ QDWXUH RI SURIHVVLRQDO VSRUWV requires some 
territorial restrictions in order both to encourage participation 
in the venture and to secure to each venturer the legitimate 
 
 248. Id. at 593. 
 249. Hearing in Re: Objection to Sale to NHL, In re Dewey Ranch, 414 B.R. 577 (No. 
1080).  
 250. In re Dewey Ranch, 414 B.R. at 590. 
 251. Id. at 590²92. 
 252. Id. at 591. 
 253. Id.  
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IUXLWV RI WKDW SDUWLFLSDWLRQµ254  -XGJH %DXP·V XVH RI WKHVH
terms is strikingly similar to the descriptions that are lodged 
by parties in antitrust actions.255  Although Judge Baum 
appears to have used such terms for his own purposes under 
section 363 of the Code, the effect is that he weighed in 
heavily on the antitrust issues. 
More evidence of this approach is the lengthy recitation by 
Judge Baum concerning the conflicting expert witness 
testimony.256  That testimony included expert opinions on the 
DQWLWUXVW LVVXH SDUWLFXODUO\ ´WKHLU SRVLWLRQV RQ WKH
appropriate relocation fee due the NHL if the court approved 
36(·V ELG Dnd the appropriateness of Hamilton as an NHL 
VLWH IRU WKH &R\RWHVµ257  Judge Baum briefly listed the 
opinions of several experts who, when their testimony is 
considered collectively, presented sound arguments that the 
relocation of the Coyotes was reasonable.258  One of these 
experts, Andy Baziliauskas, was experienced in antitrust law 
DQGVWDWHGWKDWWKH1+/·V%\ODZVDQGWKHYHWRSRZHURIWKH
Toronto Maple Leafs were inherently anticompetitive.259  
%D]LOLDXVNDV DOVR QRWHG WKDW WKH 1+/·V UHVWULFWLRQV RQ
relocation were unjustified and that a demand for a relocation 
fee would also be anticompetitive.260  Although Judge Baum 
recognized this testimony, his ruling clearly supports the view 
posed by expert Franklin M. Fisher, whose expert testimony 
was the most heavily cited in his opinion.261  Fisher, a 
specialist in the area of antitrust law, testified that the NHL 
must be considered a single entity for antitrust purposes.262  
He also stated that the NHL has no anticompetitive interest 
when it comes to evaluating the ownership changes of certain 
franchises within the league.263  Rather, Fisher contended 
WKDW WKH 1+/·V UXOHV DFW ´WR VDIHJXDUG WKH TXDOLW\ RI 1+/
 
 254. Id. 
 255. See generally /$0HP·O&ROLVHXP&RPP·QY1DW·O)RRWEDOO/HDJXH)G
WK&LUQRWLQJWKDW´WKHQDWXUHRI1)/IRRWEDOOUHTXLUHVVRPHWHUULWRULDO
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KRFNH\ DQG SURPRWH WKH OHDJXH·V FRPSHWLWLYH VXFFHVVµ264  It 
appears that Judge Baum weighed this expert testimony 
heavily in favor of a finding that antitrust provisions do not 
apply to professional sports leagues.265  
-XGJH%DXP·VPRWLYHLQGHFLGLQJWKH&R\RWHVFDVHLQWKLV
manner is uncertain.  Why would Judge Baum weigh in on 
the antitrust issues when doing so was not necessary for his 
ruling?  His decision could simply have relied on his findings 
in the prior motion without an expanded discussion of the 
antitrust implications.  One explanation may be that he felt 
that the bankruptcy court was being used as part of an end 
run by PSE and the Debtors to avoid the more risky federal 
district court option for redress of sports league sale and 
relocation issues.  By including the extensive discussion of 
antitrust issues and relevant expert opinion but then 
GLVSRVLQJRIWKHFRQWURYHUV\E\VLPSO\VWDWLQJWKDWWKH1+/·V
interests were compelling without expanded discussion of the 
antitrust implications, Judge Baum effectively issued a de 
facto antitrust decision and signaled to future petitioners that 
utilization of the bankruptcy court for the purposes of sale 
and relocation issues will not be tolerated.  Interestingly, 
Judge Baum may have signaled his methodology and this 
result by his statement in Dewey Ranch I that the court is not 
FRQFHUQHGZLWK LVVXLQJ D GHFLVLRQ WKDWZRXOG ´ZUHDN KDYRFµ
on professional sports.266  ,I WKLV ZDV WUXO\ -XGJH %DXP·V
intention, it may answer the question why the court seemed 
to be going to such lengths to find in favor of the NHL and to 
disregard the legal implications of antitrust law in this 
setting.  One possibility is that the court was less concerned 
with the impact on the parties than with the perceived misuse 
of the bankruptcy court.   
B. Could Different Facts Yield a Different Result? 
Notwithstanding the possibility that Judge Baum may 
have been sending a signal to future sports franchise 
petitioners, it is important to consider the relevant facts of the 
case and how different facts may yield a different result.  If 
the facts in Dewey Ranch I had been more compelling in favor 
 
 264. Id.  
 265. Id. at 591. 
 266. In re Dewey Ranch Hockey, LLC, 406 B.R. 30, 42 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2009). 
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of PSE and the Debtors, would Judge Baum have exercised 
his discretion in favor of these parties and allowed them 
redress in the bankruptcy court?  More specifically, what 
facts, if any, would justify a bankruptcy court allowing the 
sale and transfer of a professional sports league franchise 
because either the non-­transferability provisions of the 
league-­franchise agreement could be excised from the 
agreement under section 365 or there is a bona fide antitrust 
dispute and/or applicable nonbankruptcy law pursuant to 
sections 363(f)(1) and 363(f)(4). 
There are several different factual scenarios to consider 
that possibly could lead a bankruptcy court to reach a 
different result.  In the Dewey Ranch decisions, the NHL was 
considered a secured creditor because it funded the Coyotes 
operating losses when Moyes could no longer fund the team.267  
If, however, the NHL had not funded the Coyotes during its 
time of financial distress, the NHL would not have been 
considered a secured creditor and the bankruptcy court may 
QRWKDYHEHHQVRLQFOLQHGWRILQGLQWKH1+/·VIDYRU 
A bankruptcy court also might reach a different conclusion 
if the party seeking to relocate a team meets league written 
requirements and presents positive integrity and character 
attributes.  Judge Baum included an extensive section in his 
Dewey Ranch II DQDO\VLVGHWDLOLQJWKH1+/·VGHFLVLRQWRUHMHFW
36(·VDSSOLFDWLRQto buy the Coyotes and to move the team to 
Canada.268  $OORIWKHOHDJXH·VUHDVRQVIRUUHMHFWLQJ%DOVLOOLH·V
ELG UHODWHG WR %DOVLOOLH·V ´LQWHJULW\ DQG ZLOOLQJQHVV WR EH D
JRRG SDUWQHUµ DV DUWLFXODWHG LQ WKHPHPRUDQGXPSUHVHQWHG
to the court by the NHL following its July 29 meeting and 
rejection of Balsillie as an owner.269  %DOVLOOLH·VFRQGXFWGXULQJ
his prior dealings with the Predators and the Penguins was 
perceived by the NHL to be in bad faith, and the league was 
worried that he would be unwilling to abide by league rules if 
he were to acquire the team and move it to Hamilton.270  The 
1+/ DOVRZDV FRQFHUQHG WKDW%DOVLOOLH·V REMHFWLYH WR DFTXLUH
DQ1+/ WHDPZDVQRW LQ WKH OHDJXH·V EHVW LQWHUHVWV271  For 
H[DPSOH WKH PHPRUDQGXP VWDWHG WKDW %DOVLOOLH·V DSSURDFK
 
 267. Id. at 33²34. 
 268. In re Dewey Ranch, 414 B.R. at 583²85. 
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 271. Id. at 585. 
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iQYROYHG ´DWWHPSWLQJ WR KROG WKH OHDJXH DQG &RPPLVVLRQHU
Bettman up to public ridicule as allegedly anti-­Canadian and 
KDUPLQJWKHOHDJXH·VJRRGZLOOZLWKIDQV . . . throughout North 
$PHULFDµ272  These statements negatively depict Balsillie as 
manipulative and spiteful, and this memorandum certainly 
PD\ KDYH LQIOXHQFHG WKH FRXUW·V GHFLVLRQ WR UHMHFW 36(·V ELG
with prejudice.  A court may be persuaded otherwise if a 
party refrains from making statements that clearly 
demonstrate a strategy to undermine the sports league and 
its representatives. 
In addition, the court may have been persuaded to find in 
favor of relocation if the proposed site was located further 
from other member franchises.  In the Dewey Ranch decisions, 
one of the major issues was that Hamilton is located within 
the home territory of the Toronto Maple Leafs.273  The NHL 
Constitution prohibits a team from moving into another 
WHDP·VKRPHWHUULWRU\ZLWKRXWWKHFRQVHQWRIWKHOHDJXH274  If, 
however, Hamilton was not located within the home territory 
of the Toronto Maple Leafs and, instead, was located in 
unclaimed territory, the court may have been more willing to 
find in favor of relocation because granting approval would 
not have directly harmed another franchise.  This relocation 
solution alone, howeveU ZRXOG QRW KDYH FXUHG WKH 1+/·V
REMHFWLRQ WR %DOVLOOLH·V DSSOLFDWLRQ³which was not filed 
according to the deadline set forth in section 363.275  
Lastly, the court may have reached a different conclusion 
if the antitrust allegations were filed in a timely manner, 
creating a history of a bona fide dispute.  Although Judge 
Baum assumed that the parties were subject to a bona fide 
dispute in Dewey Ranch II and, in turn, based his decision on 
the adequate protection requirement of 363(e),276 he was 
unwilling to find or assume a bona fide dispute in Dewey 
Ranch I because the parties had failed to file their antitrust 
claims when the petition for bankruptcy was first filed.277  
 
 272. Id.  
 273. Id. at 588²89. 
 274. Amended Complaint, supra note 27, at 8. 
 275. In re Dewey Ranch Hockey, LLC, 406 B.R. 30, 39 (Bankr'$UL]36(·V
relocation application was filed after the May 19 hearing.  Id. 
 276. In re Dewey Ranch, 414 B.R. at 590. 
 277. In re Dewey Ranch, 406 B.R. at 40.  The antitrust action was not filed until May 
7, 2009, which was two days after the Debtors had filed the Chapter 11 petition.  Id. at 
35.   
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Citing Vortex Fishing Systems, Judge Baum noted that the 
´PHUHH[LVWHQFHRISHQGLQJOLWLJDWLon or the filing of an answer 
is insufficient to establish the existence of a bona fide 
GLVSXWHµ278  If the parties had timely filed their antitrust 
claims and, therefore, established a history of dispute 
regarding the antitrust issue, Judge Baum may have been 
willing to establish a bona fide dispute.  Additionally, now 
that the Supreme Court has determined that a sports league 
cannot be considered a single entity, an argument can be 
made that there is now applicable nonbankruptcy law³
antitrust law³under section 363(f)(1) that prohibits the 
unilateral control of leagues over issues of franchise 
ownership and relocation. 
These factual issues are interesting to ponder, but it is 
doubtful that they would make much difference in the 
outcome in bankruptcy court.  Unlike trial courts where 
evidence is meticulously presented and facts carefully 
discerned, the underlying mission of the bankruptcy court 
may preclude such a process and may create a gravitational 
pull away from this kind of analysis.  The bankruptcy courW·V
role is to resolve issues of insolvency and to protect the 
interests of the parties, including claimants that likely will 
see the value of their claims significantly reduced during the 
proceedings.279  Accordingly, Dewey Ranch II ultimately 
turned on the issues of adequate protection for the sports 
league and the application of section 363(e).  As a result, it is 
likely that even if there was greater factual evidence of a bona 
fide dispute or a more compelling argument to establish 
applicable nonbankruptcy law to support a sale of the assets, 
the bankruptcy court still has the discretion under section 
363(e) to find that the rights of the NHL or other sports 
league are not adequately protected by a sale of the assets in 
a bankruptcy proceeding.   
There is an interesting Catch-­22 to this decision as it 
relates to the single entity issue.  In adopting the controlling 
line of reasoning related to protection of the interests of the 
NHL, the court made an assumption that the league actually 
has paramount compelling interests that require protection.  
The interests of the NHL have been identified as: 1) the right 
WR DGPLW RQO\ QHZPHPEHUV ZKR PHHW WKH OHDJXH·V ZULWWHQ
 
 278. Id. at 39.  
 279. Conveny, supra note 11, at 434.  
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requirements;; 2) the right to control where its members play 
their home hockey games;; and 3) the right to a relocation fee, 
if appropriate under the circumstances of the case.280  By 
making these assumptions and allowing the NHL to control in 
such a manner, the court effectively determined a single 
entity status for the league.  In the alternative, even if Judge 
Baum did not intend to characterize the NHL as a single 
entity and, instead, viewed the league as a joint venture or 
even an independent entity, he failed to lawfully apply the 
Rule of Reason analysis.  With such a result, the Rule of 
Reason effectively functions as a de facto legality rule and has 
EHHQGHVFULEHGDV´LQSUDFWLFH . . . no more than a euphemism 
IRU QRQOLDELOLW\µ281  In fact, Judge Douglas Ginsburg of the 
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals conducted a review of restraint 
cases between 1977 and 1991 and found that plaintiffs lost 
over ninety percent of the time.282  This reality may explain 
-XGJH%DXP·VUHOXFWDQFHWRDSSO\WKHGHIHQGDQW-­friendly Rule 
of Reason analysis and, instead, assume for purposes of 
MXGLFLDO HFRQRP\ WKDW WKH 1+/·V LQWHUHsts are, indeed, both 
reasonable and paramount.   
,URQLFDOO\ WKH 1+/ WRRN DGYDQWDJH RI -XGJH %DXP·V
DVVXPSWLRQV DERXW WKH FRPSHOOLQJ QDWXUH RI WKH OHDJXH·V
interests and, in arguing that the Debtors did not have a 
legitimate antitrust claim against the NHL in Dewey Ranch 
II, the NHL used the district court decision in American 
Needle as persuasive authority.283  )RUH[DPSOHLQWKH1+/·V
Motion to Dismiss, the league stressed American Needle in 
VWDWLQJWKDW´WKH6HYHQWK&LUFXLWUHFHQWO\DSSOLHGWKLV¶VLQJOH
HQWLW\· GRFWULQH WR WKH 1DWLRQDO )RRWEDOO /HDJXH . . . finding 
that when thirty-­two NFL teams get together to make 
decisions . . . they are acting as a single economic unit;; the 
VDPHSULQFLSOHDSSOLHVWRWKH1+/µ284  Because the Supreme 
Court now has overruOHG WKH 6HYHQWK &LUFXLW·V KROGLQJ D
league can no longer hide behind such case law when its 
 
 280. In re Dewey Ranch, 414 B.R. at 591. 
 281. Marina Lao, Resale Price Maintenance: The Internet Phenomenon and Free 
Rider Issues, 55 ANTITRUST BULLETIN 2, 507 (2010) (quoting Richard A. Posner, The 
Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach: Reflections on the Sylvania Decision, 45 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1, 14 (1997)).   
 282. Id. at 508 (citing Douglas H. Ginsburg, Vertical Restraints: De Facto Legality 
Under the Rule of Reason, 60 ANTITRUST L.J. 67, 71 (1990)).   
 283. McCann, supra note 99, at 775. 
 284. 1+/·V0RWLRQWR'LVPLVVsupra note 53, at 3. 
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autonomy is challenged. 
C. The Implications of American Needle  
Issues involving control by sports leagues over the sale 
and relocation of teams based on issues of antitrust law will 
depend not only on the predisposition of the bankruptcy 
courts to avoid such an end-­run around federal district courts 
EXWDOVRRQWKH6XSUHPH&RXUW·VGHFLVLRQLQAmerican Needle.  
Although the Court resolved the inconsistencies of the single 
entity analysis among the circuits, it failed to clarify the Rule 
of Reason analysis.  As a result, even though there now may 
be a more predictable avenue of redress for franchises in the 
federal district and appellate courts, the specific application of 
the Rule of Reason still is uncertain.  It can be expected, that 
in the future, litigants will continue to file cases relating to 
league control of sales agreements and franchise relocations 
in the federal courts in the hope that a judge will deem such 
control to be unreasonable under the Rule of Reason analysis.   
As litigants continue to pursue issues involving antitrust 
prohibitions within the context of sports leagues in the federal 
district courts, opportunities for petitioners in bankruptcy 
court with grievances related to antitrust law may have been 
strengthened by the decision in American Needle.  Following 
American Needle, bankruptcy courts may take a different 
approach in the future by treating teams as individual 
businesses.285  In doing so, a bankruptcy judge may even 
confirm a reorganization plan that permits the sale and 
relocation of a sports team to the highest bidder, despite 
disDSSURYDO E\ HLWKHU WKH OHDJXH RU WKH WHDP·V RZQHU286  If 
this is the case, the bankruptcy court will continue to function 
as an end-­run.  If, however, the issue is whether the 
relocation restriction is anticompetitive, under section 363 the 
bankruptcy court still would have to apply antitrust 
precedents to determine the legality of the relocation 
restriction under the Rule of Reason just as the federal 
district court is obligated to do.  In that case, there would be 
no advantage to the bankruptcy court forum over the district 
 
 285. Mark Donnel, What Role Can a Professional Sports League Play When One of 
Its Teams Enters Bankruptcy?, JETLAWBLOG (June 8, 2010, 1:00 AM), 
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court, and there would be no end run. 
Additionally, if the economy continues to suffer, 
professional sports teams will struggle financially and, like 
the Coyotes, a team may find itself insolvent and in need of 
bankruptcy relief.  The recent situation with the Texas 
Rangers provides an example.  In May 2010, the Rangers filed 
for bankruptcy protection after its owner, Tom Hicks, failed to 
sell the team in an effort to relieve its debt.287  Unlike the 
Coyotes, however, the Rangers do not appear to have filed for 
bankruptcy to circumvent league rules.  In fact, MLB 
VXSSRUWHGWKH5DQJHUV·VHIIRUWWRVHOl the team to its preferred 
applicant, the Greenberg-­Ryan Group.288  The creditors, 
however, blocked the sale, leaving MLB Commissioner Bud 
6HOLJDQ[LRXVDQGUHDG\WRLQWHUYHQH´LQWKHEHVWLQWHUHVWVRI
EDVHEDOOµ289  The auction for the team ended on August 5, 
2010, and, to the satisfaction of the team and MLB, the 
Greenberg-­5\DQ*URXS´HPHUJHGYLFWRULRXVµ290  In confirming 
WKHWHDP·VUHRUJDQL]DWLRQSODQKRZHYHUWKH*UHHQEHUJ-­Ryan 
*URXS JDLQHG RZQHUVKLS RI WKH WHDP ZLWKRXW 0/%·V GLUHFW
intervention.291  United States Bankruptcy Judge D. Michael 
Lynn presided over the Rangers case and stated early on that, 
´>0/%@ LV QRW LQ FKDUJH RI WKLV FDVHµ292  In the words of 
$VVRFLDWH3UHVVZULWHU$QJHOD.%URZQ´WKHFDVHPD\KDYH
been a wake-­up call for owners and sports executives across 
the country because it made one thing clear: [w]hen teams file 
IRU EDQNUXSWF\ WHDPV DUH QR ORQJHU LQ FKDUJHµ293  The fact 
WKDWWKH5DQJHUV·VSODQZDVFRQILUPHGZLWKRXWWKHFRQVHQWRI
0/% UDLVHV WKH TXHVWLRQ DV WR ´>ZKDW D@ SURIHVVLRQDO VSRrts 
league [can] do to stop a sale in bankruptcy of one of its 
WHDPVµ294  
In light of the Coyotes case and the recent Rangers 
decision, it is clear that the bankruptcy court does not have to 
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rule on the merits of established law in reaching a decision. 
Rather, there is an auction in bankruptcy court that is often 
unpredictable.  Perhaps this is what concerned Judge Baum 
and explains the signal that he may have been sending to 
future litigants.  It also may explain the jXGJH·VHPSKDVLVRQ
balancing the interests of the parties to the exclusion of other 
analyses.  In effect, it is possible that Judge Baum was saying 
WR IXWXUH OLWLJDQWV ´<RXFDQFRPHWKLVZD\DJDLQEXWLWZLOO
QRWEHHDV\IRU\RXµ ,QOLJKWRIWKHUHFHQWEDQNUXSWF\ILOLQJ
by the Rangers, howeYHU LW DSSHDUV WKDW WKLV ´IDFH RIIµZLOO
continue. 
CONCLUSION 
The permissible control of national sports leagues over 
individual franchise owners in the leagues in the context of 
antitrust law has evolved over the last century.  The federal 
circuits have been split on whether antitrust law applies in 
this setting, and the future for litigants has been very 
uncertain.  Most recently, the Coyotes pushed the envelope by 
seeking redress in bankruptcy court, presumably to take 
advantage of underlying protections RI FUHGLWRU·V ULJKWV DQG
what it perceived as advantageous language in the Code to 
achieve a result that may not have been possible in federal 
district court.  Although this approach was unsuccessful in 
the Dewey Ranch case, different and more compelling facts 
PD\ FKDQJH WKH UHVXOW LQ WKH IXWXUH  7KH 6XSUHPH&RXUW·V
decision in American Needle resolved the single entity issue 
as it relates to sports franchises and will affect the future of 
litigants in the federal district courts and most likely in the 
federal bankruptcy courts as well.   
 
